Facts and Comments

Authors : Alev Kiliç

Pages : 13-61

View : 34 | Download : 29

Publication Date : 2023-07-25

Article Type : Research Article

Abstract :This article covers the domestic and international developments of Armenia, the background to why the peace agreement envisaged and outlined in the cease-fire agreement of November 2020 could not be realized in the two and half years that elapsed, how the current efforts proceed, and relations between Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the normalization of relations process in the period of December 2022-June 2023. Russia’s war against Ukraine failing in its aim of a quick victory, and the prolongation of the war and its transformation into a war of attrition with the active and substantial support of the West has revealed the military deficiency of Russia. The West, seeking other means of pressing and further jeopardizing Russia, has seen the opportunity in approaching Armenia, an ally and traditionally under very tight reins of Russia, to broker the peace agreement with Azerbaijan and eventually drive Russia away and to establish its own domain. Russia too has recognized this development as a threat in the region, seen as vital for its connectivity with the South and the East and considered to be its soft belly. Armenia’s ambivalence and potential for shift of allegiances have become a serious concern for Russia. The region becoming a new flash point in the West-Russia adversity has not caused discomfort in Armenia. To the contrary, Armenia appears to have seen an advantage in dealing with parties with varying interests and calculations in the region to minimize its losses in the 2020 war and possibly make new gains. This expectation has led to the procrastination of the formulation and signing of the peace agreement. Karabakh and the issue of the delimitation of the borders have come to the fore as major obstacles. A similar duality is witnessed in domestic politics. On the one hand advocating peaceful and liberal principles, the Armenian administration has found a passable excuse for restraint in those principles due to the activities and actions of the very small but vociferous opposition guided and directed by the radical Dashnaktsutyun-ARF with a dark terrorism record and their sponsors and financers in the Diaspora. The attitude and sermons of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin very much in line with the radical opposition has been another factor in restraining the administration. Relations with Türkiye have moved within the framework of the normalization process, albeit experiencing sharp ups and downs. Armenia’s humanitarian assistance following the earthquake disaster of 6 February in Türkiye, the opening of the border crossing for Armenian vehicles to this end, the visit of the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ankara and to the disaster area have raised the hope for good-neighborly and compassionate relations. However, immediately after, the inauguration of a monument in the capital city of Yerevan consecrating radical Armenian nationalist terrorism has once again confirmed that there is no change in the anti-Turk or Türkiye sentiments and policies. It cannot be denied that these sentiments and policies enjoy the support, even encouragement of the West and religious solidarity. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s attendance to President Erdoğan’s new term reception after his election win provided another glimmer of hope for the progress of relations.
Keywords : Paşinyan, Mirzoyan, Lavrov, Blinken, Michelle, Scholz, Bono, Vardanyan, Laçin Koridoru, Zangezur Koridoru, Nemesis Anıtı