

African Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations' Security Policies: Challenges and Prospects

Afrika Bölgesi ve Afrika Alt-Bölgesi Örgütlerinin Güvenlik Politikaları: Sorunlar ve Beklentiler

Abdurrahim Siradag¹

Abstract

This article will examine peace and security policies and strategies of the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Upholding peace and security has been the first priority for the African organisations following independence. The leaders have recognised that Africa's security can only be maintained by Africans, not outside actors. In doing so, the African leaders have made efforts to create their own peace and security mechanisms through the regional and sub-regional organisations. In particular, the philosophical principle "without peace and security there is no sustainable social and economic development" plays a major role in developing the African organisations' peace and security policies. This chapter will explore the challenges facing the African organisations' peace and security policies, and discuss how African organisations can strengthen its strategic partnership with global actors in the fields of peace and security.

Keywords: *African Regional Organisations, the AU, the IGAD, the ECOWAS, the SADC, Africa, Security Policy, Peace and Security.*

¹ PhD Candidate at Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, the Netherlands and he is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the International University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Kemal INAT for his valuable comments and critics on this article, absiradag@gmail.com.

Özet

Bu makalede, Afrika Birliği'nin (AU), Hükümetlerarası Kalkınma Kurumu'nun (IGAD), Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun (ECOWAS) ve Güney Afrika Kalkınma Topluluğu'nun (SADC) barış ve güvenlik politikaları incelenmektedir. Bağımsızlıklarının ardından Afrika bölgesine yönelik kuruluşlar için birinci öncelik barışı sağlamak ve güvenlik olmuştur. Liderler, Afrika'nın güvenliğinin dış aktörler tarafından değil; sadece Afrikalılar kendileri tarafından sürdürülebileceğini kabul etmişlerdir. Afrikalı liderler, bunu gerçekleştirmek için bölgesel ve alt bölgesel kuruluşlar aracılığıyla kendi huzur ve güvenlik mekanizmalarını yaratmak için çaba göstermişlerdir. Özellikle, "barış ve güvenlik olmadan sürdürülebilir sosyal ve ekonomik gelişme mümkün değildir" felsefi ilkesi, Afrikalı örgütlerin barış ve güvenlik politikalarının geliştirilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Makalede Afrika örgütlerinin, barış ve güvenlik politikalarında karşılaştığı zorluklar analiz edilecek ve barış, güvenlik alanlarında küresel aktörlerle olan stratejik ortaklığını nasıl güçlendirdikleri tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Afrikalı Bölgesel Kuruluşlar, AU, IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC, Afrika, Güvenlik Politikaları, Barış ve Güvenlik.*

The AU's Security Policy towards Africa

Africa's first continental organisation was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established on the 25th of May 1963 by 32 African countries in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU had two essential aims: namely to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states and to eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent.ⁱ Even though the OAU failed to resolve Africa's social, economic, and political problems, it did play a pivotal role in the decolonisation process of the African states. It did not succeed in preventing conflicts or wars in Africa during its 39 year history, and could not develop an effective security policy towards Africa. However, it contributed to the emergence of the notion of unity and solidarity among the African nations.

Established on the 9th of July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, as a successor to the OAU, the African Union (AU) was intergovernmental and the most important regional organisation on the continent, comprising 53 African states. Only Morocco is not a member, having already withdrawn from the OAU, on the 12th of November 1984, following OAU recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Western Sahara) as an independent state in February 1982.ⁱⁱ

The first chair of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, explained the significance of this historical transformation at the 40th Anniversary Celebrations of the OAU in Durban, South Africa on the 25th of May 2003:

“New challenges confront us today, brought about by world-wide phenomena such as globalisation and shaped by our desire to see a prosperous, healthy, stable, unified and peaceful continent, fully living up to its promise and potential. We need to harness and use our meagre resources at hand especially our natural, cultural and human resources. We suffer hardships in our Continent, most notably, poverty and conflict. We need to

*address these challenges with dedication and commitment, and recognise that; these hardships extend beyond the original, political mandate of the OAU. For this reason, we have transformed the Organization of African Unity into the African Union in order to deal with the socio-economic development of the continent in tandem with the need to build political stability”.*ⁱⁱⁱ

Whereas the OAU objectives were too narrow, the AU objectives were more comprehensive, in particular to: (1) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; (2) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; (3) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent and (4) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union).^{iv}

Since 1960, more than 20 civil wars have broken out in Africa, and most African states have been involved in conflicts or wars, with consequent damage to social, economic, and political infrastructures, and an estimated 14 million deaths.^v While preserving peace and security has been the most fundamental objective of the Constitutive Act of the AU, decolonising the African states became the most ambitious aim of the OAU Charter. During the OAU\AU Summit in Durban in 2002, the African leaders underlined that social, economic and political developments were prerequisites for sustaining peace and security, encapsulated by Mbeki’s pronouncement that ‘there can be no sustainable development without peace, without security and without stability’.

It is essential to underline that the beginning of the twenty-first century has brought both historical opportunities and challenges to the world. In particular, it was of significance to Africa in terms of the emergence of a new political climate, with three important strategic institutions being founded, namely the AU, the New Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The idea that social, economic, and political challenges have caused conflicts and wars spread over the continent and became a common view among the African leaders in the new century. In this spirit, NEPAD was built at the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, as a socio-economic programme of the AU. The fundamental aims of NEPAD were “to eradicate poverty; place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development; halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; accelerate the empowerment of women; and fully integrate Africa into the global economy”.^{vi}

The second body, the APRM, was created within NEPAD at the sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD in Abuja, Nigeria in 2003. The main aim of the APRM was to help African governments improve their government system. The members of the AU can voluntarily become members of the APRM, which has 29 members.^{vii} Whereas the new regional organisation of Africa addresses Africa’s social, economic, and political problems, it also makes efforts to reinforce its security policy. In doing so, the AU adopted “*Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the African Union*” at the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, in Durban, South Africa on the 9th of July 2002. The Protocol came into effect on 26 December 2003, charting a course for the AU’s security policy towards Africa, and is the most prominent security strategy for the AU.

The Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC) was officially established on the 25th of May 2004, and is described in the Protocol as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”.^{viii} It claims that the AU as a regional power has a primary responsibility for keeping

peace, security, and stability in Africa, significantly emphasising that these are precondition for sustainable social, economic, and political developments. Its three essential principles related to the AU's security policy are, firstly, to increase cooperation with the international and African sub-regional organisations; secondly to strengthen relations with the African states and their security policies; and thirdly, to increase the dignity of the continent at both regional and global levels, by preventing conflicts and wars in Africa.^{ix}

The Protocol built three important strategic instruments to strengthen the AU's security policy. A "Panel of the Wise" was established as an advisory mechanism to the AU in the fields of conflict prevention, and a "Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)" objective to facilitate, anticipate, and prevent conflicts. However, the third, an "African Standby Force (ASF)," is the most significant security mechanism in the Protocol, created as a peacekeeping force of the AU and composed of civilian and military missions. In addition, developing a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) has been a prominent aim since the establishment of the AU. To achieve this, the AU adopted the Solemn Declaration in February 2004, in Sirte, Libya, a momentous step in creating a CADSP. The Declaration emphasised that building a common defence and security identity was necessary to retain peace, security, and stability in Africa, and is regarded as one of the most noteworthy components of the AU's security policy.

The AU as a new organisation has begun to play a central role in preserving peace and security in the conflict zones of Africa since its creation. It has deployed three major peacekeeping operations since 2002, which are the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMIB was deployed in April 2003 in a mission that ended in June 2004, the main aims of which were to monitor the Ceasefire Agreement and to reinforce the peace process in Burundi.^x AMIS ran from July 2004 to

December 2007, with the main objectives being to monitor and verify the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and maintain peace and security in Darfur.^{xi} AMISOM was mandated in February 2007, and was still running, Its main aims are to sustain peace and security and to improve the humanitarian condition in Somalia.^{xii} The AU also authorised a peacekeeping mission in the Comoros in March 2006 to observe and keep peace and security during the electoral period. The AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) completed its mission in June 2006.^{xiii} Furthermore, the AU has strengthened its relations with international organisations, including the UN, the EU, the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa in the field of security.

Table 1: AU civilian and military operations in Africa^{xiv}

Operation	Country	Year	Cost
African Union Mission (AMIB)	Burundi	2003-2004	\$134 million
African Union Mission (AMIS)	Sudan	2004-2007	\$466 million
African Union Mission (AMISOM)	Somalia	2005-2008	\$622 million
The African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006	\$12 million

Though the AU has made some structural reforms and great efforts in a short time to reinforce its security policy, as a young regional organisation it faces serious challenges. Firstly, the lack of political union within the member states of the AU remains the greatest challenge for developing the CADSP of the AU. Each African country traditionally has different

economic and political policy, importantly with different colonial relationships with the former colonial powers. The second challenge for the AU's security policy, consists of financial and logistical constraints, which are common to AU's peacekeeping operations in Africa. In particular, outside donations and assistance from different international organisations and developed countries have played a critical role in the implications of the AU's security policy. The third challenge is the lack of the AU capacity building. The AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which consists of the ASF, the Panel of Wise, and the CEWS. However, the AU lacks an effective leadership, conflict-management and resolution policy and sufficient military and civilian structures. The AU itself also described this challenge as a 'chronic shortage of capacity' at a meeting on the 14th of May 2007. Meanwhile, the AU failed to keep peace and security in North Africa in the beginning of 2011.

At the Fourth Joint Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Finance of the AU held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2011, the President of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, said that Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa provide 15 percent of the AU's budget each year. Some 77 percent have been provided by the global actors, mainly the EU. Libya was the largest financial supporter of the AU from among its members. Following the start of the Libyan War of 2011, the AU's financial power has weakened seriously. He warned that, if the AU members would not support the Union, it would not carry out its mission independently.

The AU's efforts in peace and security in Africa have contributed to the development of strategic partnership between Africa and the global actors, such as the UN, and the EU; however the AU's structural problems have damaged it. Developing an effective common security policy within the member states of the AU is necessary for playing a more active role in this strategic partnership. Without it, this partnership would not work effectively. Furthermore, fair security cooperation between the AU and

the international community depends on the AU's political will and capacity.

The IGAD's Security Policy towards East Africa

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organisation in East Africa, established on the 21st of March 1996 as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) created in January 1986 by six Eastern African countries. Its head office is located in the city of Djibouti in the Republic of Djibouti, and it currently has seven members, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Uganda. The IGADD's aims were to combat against famine, drought, economic issues, and ecological degradation in East Africa.^{xv} Its objectives were widened in 1996 and included social, economic, political developments in East Africa. Since the establishment of the IGAD, creating an effective security policy among the member states has been its primary aim.

The IGAD's main objectives are: to retain peace, security, and stability and to accomplish prosperity and regional integration among the member states. The IGAD's security policy towards East Africa is stated in Article 18A of the IGAD Charter:^{xvi} (1) To act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress; (2) To take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation peace and stability; (3) To establish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes and (4) To deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism, before they are referred to other regional or international organisations.

The Peace and Security Division, is the most important means of the IGAD sustaining peace and security in the region. It consists of Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR), political affairs, and

humanitarian affairs. It also organises the programmes of IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). One of the greatest challenges IGAD faces is its capacity building, so, the heads of state and governments of the IGAD adopted a protocol in Khartoum, Sudan on the 9th of January 2002; regarding the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the IGAD's Peace and Security Division. In particular, CEWARN aims at reinforcing the IGAD member states' capacity building in the fields of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It is the key component of the IGAD's Peace and Security Division.^{xvii}

The AU ASF is divided into five groups to coordinate its peace and security activities effectively in Africa: namely the North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Central Africa Force *Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale* (FOMAC), Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), and ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG). IGAD coordinates the programme of EASBRIG and works closely with the AU in the areas of peace and security,^{xviii} as well as with the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), which was established with the Nairobi Declaration on the 15th of March 2000. RECSA's main function is: to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and East Africa.^{xix} Since the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, IGAD has been playing a key role in facilitating and observing the Sudan peace process. Furthermore, it contributed to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with two peacekeeping battalions from Uganda and Kenya. In Somalia, it has played vital roles in reinforcing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and assisted the TFG to prepare the National Security Stabilisation Plan (NSSP). In addition, it has made efforts to lift the UN arms embargo against the TFG, to make it a more active and more effective political instrument in the

country. In January, IGAD was authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, named IGASOM. However, it could not implement it in 2006, but rather the AU Peace and Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, in April 2007.^{xx}

A series of internal and external factors have contributed to the deterioration of IGAD's capacity. There is not such a strong coordination between the members, because while some are actively engaged in IGAD's programmes and activities, others are not. For instance, Kenya and Uganda have recently developed their relations with the East African Community (EAC), originally established in 1967 and revived in July 2000.^{xxi} It currently has five members, namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. Even though IGAD adopted a number of protocols and declarations regarding peace and security, they cannot be materialised effectively. IGAD is also greatly dependent on outside donations and assistance, and regularly organises a Donor's Forum. Since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the country has not had an effective central government. Likewise, Sudan has faced complicated internal problems for a long time, with border disagreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea continuing. All these political and economic challenges in the region have threatened IGAD's effectiveness and reduced its power.

Healy^{xxii} points out that IGAD does not have an effective security policy towards East Africa. Moreover, IGAD still uses old-fashioned political mechanisms to stop the conflicts in the region, which are respect for "the sovereign equality of all Member States and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States".^{xxiii} Importantly, international actors, including the USA, France, Britain, China and Italy have become strongly engaged in political developments in East Africa, due to their geo-economic and geo-strategic interests. International actors' involvement has made East Africa complex and weakened the IGAD's security policy.

The making of an effective security policy toward East Africa, might be possible with strong political determination of the member states of the IGAD, rather than engagement by international organisations or other outside powers.

IGAD, as a regional actor, has critical duties for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in East Africa. It has strengthened its political and economic relations with international organisations, such as with the UN and the EU, and so far has taken important responsibilities to facilitate the peace processes in Somalia and Sudan. However, it failed to bring lasting peace and security to the region. IGAD's ineffective security policy contributes neither to security in East Africa nor to the development of strategic partnership in security matters between Africa and international organisations, such as the UN and the EU.

The ECOWAS's Security Policy towards West Africa

The leaders of the fifteen West African countries^{xxiv} signed the *Treaty of Lagos* in Nigeria on the 28th of May 1975 to establish the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organisation in West Africa and one of the most prominent pillars of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)^{xxv} in Africa, with headquarters in the city of Abuja, Nigeria. The notion of a West African Community goes back to the Liberian President William Tubman, who made a proposal to the West African countries to create a community in order to increase economic integration in 1964, which however failed. The establishment of ECOWAS was an historic event in the development of West Africa and the continent as a whole, the main purpose being to achieve economic integration in order to set up an economic union in West Africa^{xxvi}. The leaders of the West African countries recognised that without economic integration in the region, political and social developments would not exist, so, the notion of economic partnership emerged as a precondition in West Africa for raising the living standards of African people.

Article 58 of the *Treaty of ECOWAS*^{xxvii} contains strategies and policies regarding peace and security in West Africa: (1) Member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region and (2) In pursuit of these objectives, member states undertake to cooperate with the community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts.

Economic and political infrastructures in many Western African countries remain fragile and have continued to threaten socio-economic and political stability. Even though promoting economic integration among the members has been the first priority of the ECOWAS at the first years of its establishment, preserving peace and security in the region has been a more important concern in the long run. ECOWAS's objectives have widened to include social and political developments, according to the new challenges emerging in the sub-region and in Africa. With the outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the principle of "without peace and security, there is no sustainable social, economic, and political stability" has become more popular in West Africa. Therefore, the ECOWAS leaders have begun to pay more attention to sustaining peace and security in the region since the 1990s. In doing so, they have taken serious steps to strengthen ECOWAS's peace and security mechanisms.

A *Protocol*^{xxviii} relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security was adopted by the ECOWAS members on the 10th of December 1999 in Lome, Togo. It established two important peace and security mechanisms: ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which is a civilian and military force of the organisation, and a Sub-Regional Peace and Security Observation System (ECOWAS Early Warning System). The 1999 Protocol aimed to "strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-

border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines” among the members.^{xxix} ECOWAS also adopted *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other related materials* in Abuja, Nigeria on the 26th of June 2006, the main objective of which was “to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS”.^{xxx}

The outbreak of the conflicts and wars in Liberia in 1989, in Sierra Leone in 1991, in Guinea Bissau in 1998 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, undermined the ECOWAS's security policy and led to the emergence of the ECOWAS's new and more active conflict prevention strategies. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) adopted on the 1st of January 2008 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso is the most important strategic plan regarding the ECOWAS's security policy towards West Africa. Essentially, ECOWAS's security paradigm has shifted from “state security” to a “human security”^{xxxii} through the ECPF. The primary responsibility of the ECPF is to ‘strengthen human security^{xxxii} in the region’.

ECPF particularly encourages strengthening cooperation with African organisations, international organisations, and global actors in the areas of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It also coordinates ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIIG). It is worth noting that the ECPF provides an impetus for the establishment of a consistent and effective security policy towards the sub-region. In addition, it conceptualised the ECOWAS's conflict prevention, management, and resolution strategies and policies. Significantly, it creates a link between security and democracy and good governance. The ECPF stresses that promoting democracy and good governance in West African countries will help to maintain peace, security, and stability in the sub-region.^{xxxiii}

ECOWAS deployed peacekeeping operations in Liberia in 1990 and 2003, in Sierra Leone in 1997, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2002, and the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia in 2003 (ECOMIL). Its peacekeeping experiences and strategies in West Africa became a worthy asset for the AU and the RECs. However, ECOWAS has also faced some challenges that damage the evolution of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. It has failed to implement its strategic plan regarding conflict prevention, management, and resolution. First, the lack of a strong coordination between the members within ECOWAS remains the greatest challenge and weakens its security policy towards the region. Second, nor does ECOWAS pay attention to civil societies, therefore there is still not enough cooperation between ECOWAS and them in the areas of conflict prevention. Third, ECOWAS does not have a strong relationship with external actors in the fields of peace and security. Fourth, ECOWAS still does not have an effective conflict prevention mechanism to predict potential conflicts and wars. Fifth, it lacks capacity building and human capacity. In particular, when it deploys a peacekeeping operation in a conflict area, its financial and logistical constraints undermine its power. Sixth, the rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone countries in West Africa have continued and diminished ECOWAS's effectiveness in the areas of conflict prevention.^{xxxiv}

ECOWAS's new security paradigm, which is a transformation from the state security to human security, has brought a new perspective to Africa's peace and security. Its new strategy also underlined that old-fashioned security policies of the African organisations failed to achieve peace and security. Moreover, it underscored that peace and security can only be sustained by Africans, not outside actors. A new security paradigm of ECOWAS emerged as a necessary circumstance to effectively maintain peace and security in West Africa, and appeared as an independent security policy of ECOWAS rather than external pressures. It is difficult to say that ECOWAS can contribute to the development of strategic

partnership in the areas of peace and security between Africa and global actors, because of its having serious political and financial challenges.

The SADC's Security Policy towards Southern Africa

The history of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) lies in the 1970s. On the 1st of April 1980, the Front Line States (FLS) group^{xxxv} organised a conference entitled “the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)” in Lusaka in Zambia and adopted the Lusaka Declaration, which aimed at increasing economic cooperation among the FLS group members in Southern Africa and getting rid of the economic dependence on apartheid South Africa.^{xxxvi} The FLS group was dissolved when the black majority of South Africa won the first democratic election in 1994. The fifteen Southern African countries signed the Declaration and Treaty of SADC at the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Windhoek, Namibia, on the 17th of August, 1992. Then, SADCC was transformed into SADC with the Declaration and Treat of SADC in 1992. Currently having 14 members^{xxxvii} and a head office located in Gaborone, Botswana, it is an inter-governmental organisation. Schoeman^{xxxviii} states that the new transformation from SADCC into SADC emerged as a result of the end of the Cold War and demise of apartheid in South Africa.

The main objectives of SADC are to “achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration”.^{xxxix} The most important protocol of the SADC regarding its peace and security policy is *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation* adopted in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14th August, 2001. The Protocol institutionalises SADC's peace and security policies and strategies. Significantly, it established the Organ^{xl} on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, the main objectives of which are to: (1) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against

instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, interstate conflict and aggression; (2) promote political co-operation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions; (3) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; (4) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and United Nations respectively; (5) observe, and encourage state parties to implement UN, AU and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states and (6) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations.^{xli}

Schoeman^{xlii} points out that whereas SADCC approached the definition of security from only a military perspective, SADC approaches it also from societal, economic, environmental, and psychological perspectives. The 2001 Protocol created two important mechanisms within the Organ, namely to conduct SADC's political and security programmes, which are Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), and Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)^{xliii}. ISDSC is the most substantial mechanism within the Organ to conduct the SADC's peace and security programmes. While Derblom and Hull^{xliv} describe ISPDC as a soft power of SADC, they depict it as a hard power of the SADC. In April 2002, SADC reinforced its peace and security institute with the adoption of *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation* (SIPO), which provides strategies regarding SADC's peace and security policies and explores the challenges that weaken the SADC peace and security efforts. Besides, SIPO^{xlv} emphasises that structural problems, such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, corruption and crime, weaken the SADC peace and security mechanism and cause social, economic and political instability in the sub-region.

On the 26th of August 2003, SADC signed *SADC Mutual Pact* in Dar es Salam, Tanzania, which provides strategies to create collective self-defence^{xlvi} among the SADC members, and complements the 2001 Protocol of SADC. The Pact stresses that developing the notion of collective self-defence among the members is indispensable to sustain peace, security, and stability in the region.^{xlvii} Meanwhile, SADC became a part of the AU Standby Force by establishing SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIC) on the 17th of August 2007, in Lusaka, Zambia. This comprises civilian, military, and police ingredients, but the most significant feature is that it enables deployment of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict area in the region of Southern Africa for the sake of peace, security, and stability.^{xlviii} In 1995, SADC set up a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, in order to strengthen its peacekeeping capacity. SADC deployed two peacekeeping operations in 1998 in the DRC and Lesotho. Only small numbers of the SADC members were involved in the peacekeeping operations in both countries. Since 1998, SADC has not authorised any peacekeeping operations. The poor coordination among the members of SADC during the two peacekeeping operations weakened its security policy.

Critics argue that SADC's peace and security policies and strategies are too vague and ambitious, and that SADC makes them without taking into consideration its financial or human capacity.^{xlix} Political issues in Zimbabwe and in the DRC, and the emergence of a military coup in Madagascar in March 2009, damaged regional stability today. It is important to underline that SADC prefers to use its soft power to resolve peace and security challenges facing Southern Africa rather than its hard power. SADC called upon the international community to lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe and urged that placing economic sanctions against Zimbabwe would aggravate the political crisis and increase suffering in the country. Schalkwyk¹ argues that SADC failed to develop an effective security policy towards Southern Africa. The ideological

camp between the members of the SADC and unclear security concepts of the Organ have made SADC peace and security policy ineffective. SADC needs to create a holistic approach regarding its peace and security policy. More importantly, it should focus on the concept of human security rather than that of state security.

SADC, as an important regional actor, plays a strategic role in mitigating political crises in the region and developing strategic partnership between Africa and global actors. Especially, its soft power increases the importance of the concept of pro-active diplomacy and active leadership of SADC. Developing the notion of soft power diplomacy through SADC can also be an asset for the progress of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. However, it requires human and logistical capacity. Without them, using only soft power to resolve security issues cannot be an effective diplomatic tool or contribute to the reinforcement of strategic partnership with the EU.

Even though the African organisations have several structural challenges that weaken strategic partnership among the African countries, they have taken significant steps to create a collective security system for the whole continent. Importantly, the African organisations' efforts have enhanced the notion of strategic partnership and increased the significance of the neoliberal institutional theory, according to which, cooperation can reinforce political and economic stability, and contribute to peace and security. However, the main problem behind the establishment of a collective security framework in Africa is that economic and political relations among the African states are not strong and therefore the concept of economic interdependence cannot play a dynamic role in consolidating the continental security framework. It can be said that the assumptions of the neoliberal institutionalist theory cannot be implemented by the African organisations effectively.

Assessment

The AU and the RECs have taken significant steps to sustain peace and security in the conflict areas of Africa. In particular, the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 brought new hope for the whole continent to keep peace, security, and stability. The African organisations' efforts led to the re-birth of the concept of African ownership, and strengthened the principle of African solutions to African problems. However, the concept needs to be strengthened by a strong political will. Increasing inclusive relations between the African states is necessary to raise the standards of the African people and maintain peace and security. Implementing a peace and security policy is a challenging task for the African organisations, because there are many challenges that damage it, such as internal and external factors, including poverty, unemployment, disasters, and mismanagement, the ideological divisions between the states and the external actors' economic and political interests in Africa.

The African regional and sub-regional organisations can play a worthy role in strengthening strategic partnership between Africa and the global actors, if they focus on the concept of human security rather than the state security. This article has argued that the African organisations' weak security policies and strategies cannot contribute to the development of strategic partnership with the international community in the areas of peace and security. Nor can such security policies create independent security concepts or concentrate the interests of the African people. Whereas the African organisations' effective security policies contribute to the emergence of genuine cooperation with global actors, their weak security policies undermine its development. The establishment of the AU in 2002 consolidated the concept of strategic partnership; however, African organisations' fragile security policies weaken the aims of the neoliberal institutionalism. Strengthening political, social, and economic relations between the African nations are necessary to create economic interdependence among the African nations. Without boosting economic

and political relations between the African nations, strategic partnership between Africa and the global actors could not resolve Africa's structural challenges.

The establishment of the AU, NEPAD, and the African sub-regional organisations' efforts to preserve peace and security led to the re-emergence of the concept of African ownership,ⁱⁱ which now plays a strategic role in developing their peace and security policies. The history of the concept of African ownership goes back to the Pan-Africanist movements.ⁱⁱⁱ According to Esmenjaud and Franke, there are two kinds of "African ownership", one negative the other positive. While the concept of negative African ownership is controlled by external actors and concentrates on the interests of the external actors, the other is controlled by Africans and focuses on the interests of the African people. The concept of African ownership has been evolving since 2000, but has done so with the financial and political support of external actors. Creating an independent concept of African ownership is necessary to make African organisations' peace and security policies effective.

Notes

ⁱ http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf (Article 2 of the OAU Charter) (Accessed on 21 August 2011).

ⁱⁱ Wellens, K. C. (1990). *Resolution and statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946-1989): a thematic guide*. (Editor). The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pg. 48.

ⁱⁱⁱ http://www.africaunion.org/official_documents/speeches_&_statements/HE_Thabo_Mbiki/%2025%20May%202003.htm (Accessed on 15 June 2011).

^{iv} http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm (Accessed on 16 June 2011).

^v Leitenberg, M. (2006). *Deaths in wars and conflicts in the 20th century*. 3rd Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University, pg. 77-79.

^{vi} NEPAD Secretariat (2003). *Declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance*. 6th Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, 9 March 2003, Abuja, Nigeria. NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU/Annex. I. pg. 1-9.

^{vii} Ibid.

^{viii} http://www.africa-union.org/rule_prot/PROTOCOL-%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20COUNCIL%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf.

(Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 2) (Accessed on 10 June 2011) .

^{ix} Ibid. (Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 3). (Accessed on 10 June 2011).

^x Siradag, A. (2009). *Cooperation between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) with regard to peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa*. MA dissertation. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg, pg. 70.

^{xi} Ibid. p. 46.

^{xii} Ibid. p. 76.

^{xiii} Ibid. p. 80-2.

^{xiv} Ibid. p. 130.

^{xv} Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Charter, Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996, pg.2.

^{xvi} Ibid.

^{xvii} Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States, Khartoum, Sudan, 9 January, 2002. (Article 5 of the Protocol of the CEWARN).

^{xviii} Alghali, Z. A. & Mbaye, M. (2008). The African Standby Force and regional standby brigades. *Conflict Trends*, 3:34-39, pg. 34-5.

^{xix} Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, 15 March 2000, Regional Centre on Small Arms, pg. 1-3.

^{xx} Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (2007). *Annual report 2007*. Djibouti. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), pg. 45-6.

^{xxi} Institute for Security Studies (2003). *IGAD's role in regional processes for promoting and sustaining peace*. Appendix A. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

^{xxii} Healy, S. (2009). *Peacemaking in the midst of war: an assessment of IGAD's contribution to regional security*. Working Paper, No: 59. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, pg. 15.

^{xxiii} Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Charter, Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March 1996. (IGAD Charter, 1996:2), (Article 6A of IGAD Charter).

^{xxiv} When ECOWAS was created in 1975, it only had 15 members. Cape Verde became a sixteenth member of the organization in 1976. However, Mauritania left the organization in 2002. The current ECOWAS' members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

^{xxv} It consists of seven sub-regional organisations in Africa, which are Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

^{xxvi} <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en> (Accessed on 7 July 2011).

^{xxvii} Ibid.

^{xxviii} This Protocol replaced *Protocol on Non-Aggression* signed in 1978 and *Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence* signed 1981, both defined the concept of security from a narrow perspective and approached conflict and wars according to the period of the Cold War. However, 1999 Protocol was written in accordance with the new millennium. For instance, it deals with conflict prevention, management, and resolution strategies and polices and defines the concept of security from a broader perspective.

^{xxix} http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf (Accessed on 23 July 2011).

^{xxx} Economic Community of West African States, *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other related materials*, Abuja, 26 June 2006. (Article 2 of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons).

^{xxxi} It is defined in the ECPF as “the creation of conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people's and individual rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want” (Section II,7 of the ECPF). (Section II, 4 of the ECPF).

^{xxxii} ECOWAS developed three important systematic methods to guard and strengthen human security in West Africa through the ECPF. The first is “the Responsibility to prevent,” which allows for taking actions to prevent intra and inter state conflicts and wars, and to remove the root causes of conflicts. The second is “the Responsibility to react,” which allows taking for actions to

stop humanitarian disasters. The third one is “the Responsibility to rebuild,” which allows for taking action in post-conflict reconstruction, such as rehabilitation, recovery, and reconciliation after conflicts, wars, or natural disasters (Section VII,41 of the ECPF). (Section II, 5 of the ECPF)

^{xxxiii} Economic Community of West African States, *Conflict Prevention Framework*, Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08. Ouagadougou, 1 January 2008. (Section VIII, 52 of the ECPF).

^{xxxiv} Ibid.(Section II, 2-3 of the ECPF).

^{xxxv} The FLS group was established in 1970 to struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa and to achieve liberation movements in the Southern African region. The FLS’ members were Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. Zimbabwe joined the group in 1980 after it gained its independence from Britain (Bowen, 1990:29-31). Bowen, B. (1990). The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). *Tr6caire Development Review*, pp. 29-45.

^{xxxvi} Bowen, B. (1990). The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). *Tr6caire Development Review*, pp. 29-45, pg. 29-31.

^{xxxvii} The current members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADC suspended the membership of Madagascar in 2009 due to the emergence of a military coup in this country.

^{xxxviii} Schoeman, M. (2002). *From SADCC to SADC and beyond: the politics of economic integration*. Stellenbosh: Economic History Association, pg. 2.

^{xxxix} Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Declaration and Treat of SADC*, 17 August 1992, Windhoek, Namibia. (Chapter 3, Article 5 of the SADC Treaty and Declaration).

^{xl} According to the Protocol (2001:2), “the Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework by which Member States could co-ordinate policies and activities in the area of politics, defence and security.”

^{xli} Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation*, 14 August 2001, Blantyre, Malawi. (Article 2 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation).

^{xlii} Schoeman, M. (2002). *From SADCC to SADC and beyond: the politics of economic integration*. Stellenbosh: Economic History Association, pg. 6.

^{xliii} Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation*, 14 August 2001, Blantyre, Malawi. (Article 3 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation)

^{xliv} Derblom, M. & Hull, C. (2009). *Abandoning frontline trenches? capabilities for peace and security in the SADC region*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), pg. 29.

^{xlv} Southern African Development Community (SADC), *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO)*, 24–26 April 2002, Maputo, Mozambique, pg. 37.

^{xlvi} It is described in SADC Mutual Pact as “the measures undertaken collectively by the State Parties to ensure peace, stability and security in the Region.”

^{xlvii} Southern African Development Community (SADC), *SADC Mutual Pact*, 26 August 2003, Dar es Salam, Tanzania. (Article 4 of the SADC Mutual Pact).

^{xlviii} Southern African Development Community (SADC), *the establishment of Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade (SADCBRIC)*, SADC/CM/2007/3.3.3D, 17 August 2007, Lusaka, Zambia. (Article 4 of the SADCBRIC).

^{xlix} Derblom, M. & Hull, C. (2009). *Abandoning frontline trenches? capabilities for peace and security in the SADC region*. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) pg. 32.

¹ Schalkwyk, G. V. (2005). Challenges in the creation of a Southern African sub-regional security community. *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, 1(1):33-43, pg. 38-9.

ⁱⁱ Boughton and Mourmouras (2002:3) define ownership as “a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country’s own interest”. Boughton, J.M. & Mourmouras, A. (2002). *Is policy ownership an operational concept?* Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

ⁱⁱⁱ The notion of regional and sub-regional organisations was institutionalised in Africa during the nineteenth century, based on racial struggle and turning to independent struggle during the twentieth century. The role of the Pan-African Congresses (PACs) had a significant effect on materialising the idea of regional organisations and the notion of African ownership, as the participants emphasised the importance of political and economic cooperation among the African states. The PACs were held on different dates and in various countries, in the USA, France, and England, in 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1945. The idea of Pan-Africanism particularly was formalised in the fifth meeting of the PAC held in England, in 1945. This movement has played an historical role in the formation of the notion of Pan-Africanism, the notion of regional organisations in Africa as well as the notion of the African ownership (Geiss, 1968:3-8). Geiss, I. (1968). *The Pan-African movement: a History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa*. Great Britain: Meier Publishers.

