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Arařtırma Makalesi

**INDIA’S “COLD START DOCTRINE” AND PAKISTAN’S FIRST USE
THREAT: ASSESING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE***

Hindistan’ın “Sođuk Bařlangıř” Siyaseti ve Pakistan’ın İlk Atak Tehdidini: Nükleer Caydırıcılıđın Deđerlendirilmesi

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Abstract

Pakistan and India are the two countries facing nuclear deterrence from each other as they have had a conflict since 1947. This creates a threat to South Asian regions Pakistan is using nuclear deterrence in order to discourage Indian conventional dominance. On the other hand, as India does not have the ability to change the quality of being at a competitive advantage of it is conventional to finish the Kashmir war with Pakistan, India established the doctrine called -Cold Start Doctrine- in 2004, which is an assaultive doctrine. According to this doctrine, India can militarize in a quick way and use small retaliatory attacks on Pakistan without trespassing into their nuclear part. Cold Start gives an advantage to India for being more capable of a conventional mobilization when acting together with their Air Force. This might escalate the risk of nuclear war in the subcontinent. In this paper, the strategic balance of Pakistan and India is compared. It also examines how the Cold Start doctrine of India affected Pakistan’s nuclear weapon policy and Pakistan moved toward ‘First Strike Use’. The nuclear balance is explained by assessing the development of Pakistan’s atomic weapons store and India’s nuclear arsenal.

Keywords: *Cold Start Doctrine, Nuclear Deterrence, Second Strike, Pakistan, India.*

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Öz

Pakistan ve Hindistan, 1947'den beri aralarında bir çatışma olduğu için nükleer caydırıcılıkla karşı karşıya olan iki ülke. Bu, tüm Güney Asya bölgeleri için bir tehdit oluşturuyor. Pakistan, Hindistan'ın konvansiyonel silah üstünlüğünü ve nükleer silah tehlikesini önlemek için nükleer caydırıcılık kullanıyor. Öte yandan, Hindistan, Pakistan ile Keşmir savaşını bitirmek için konvansiyonel silah rekabet avantajına sahip olma niteliğini değiştiremeyeceğinden, 2004 yılında saldırı amaçlı olan Soğuk Başlangıç Doktrini adlı doktrini oluşturmuştur. Bu doktrine göre, Hindistan hızlı bir şekilde askerileşebilir ve Pakistan'ın nükleer kısmına dokunmadan küçük misilleme saldırıları düzenleyebilir. Soğuk Başlangıç doktrini, Hindistan'a Hava Kuvvetleri ile birlikte hareket ederek konvansiyonel seferberlikte daha iyi avantaj sağlıyor. Ancak bu, Hint Alt Kıtasında nükleer savaş riskini artırabilir. Bu yazıda, araştırmacı Pakistan ve Hindistan'ın stratejik dengesini karşılaştırdı. Ayrıca, Hindistan'ın Soğuk Başlangıç Doktrininin Pakistan'ın nükleer silah politikasını nasıl etkilediğini ve Pakistan'ın "İlk Atak" kullanımına nasıl geçtiğini inceliyor. Pakistan-Hindistan nükleer dengesi, Pakistan'ın nükleer silah deposunun ve Hindistan'ın nükleer cephaneliğinin gelişimi değerlendirilerek açıklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Soğuk Başlangıç Doktrini, Nükleer Caydırıcılık, İkinci Atak, Pakistan, Hindistan.

Introduction

The new threats such as the proliferation of weapons, which brings mass destruction, emergence into the world and changed the old approaches to security. For this new approach to security, Globalization added a recent and crucial form. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is the problem of all the countries in the contemporary world. Pakistan and India are the two countries facing nuclear deterrence from each other as they have had a conflict since 1947. This creates a threat to all South Asian regions.

This study, first explained what are deterrence, nuclear doctrine, first strike use, and second-strike use as general means. The Pakistan- India nuclear balance is explained by assessing the development of Pakistan's atomic weapons store and India's nuclear arsenal. After the nuclear balance is explained; the study gives a comparing assessment of India and Pakistan's strategic balance by using the comparison of the military strengths of both countries, describing the "Second strike" capability of Pakistan. In the last part of the study before the conclusion, the detail of the "Cold Star" doctrine of India and the First Use Option of Pakistan is given. In light of the aforementioned setting, this essay discusses Pakistan's endeavor to create a modern nuclear doctrine to control its nuclear arsenal and analyzes the challenges India and Pakistan confront while creating nuclear doctrines. This essay aims to put everything into perspective in order to comprehend the evolving structure of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine of "First Strike Use."

Conceptual Framework

What Is Deterrence?

When the states who have nuclear weapons use a principle to justify their weapons it's called deterrence. Deterrence is not what it used to be. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was the backbone of U.S. national security. Its purpose, logic, and effectiveness were well understood. It was the essential military strategy behind containing the Soviet Union and a crucial ingredient in winning the Cold War without fighting World War III. But in recent decades, deterrence has gone astray, and U.S. defense policy is worse for the change (Betts, 2013). Some things have to be done for deterrence to succeed and preclude the nuclear war that could bring disaster to humankind. Betts is saying that for productive deterrence there should be wise parties who conduct nuclear weapons to engage in coherent behavior and have wise opponents who are afraid to die. Heads of the states should act wisely during crisis times because they have very limited time to decide. Although no nuclear war happened during the past fifty years, this does not mean that it will never happen. A small fault in deterrence can cause a nuclear war. "Deterrence is a strategy for combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war. Academics have explored countless variations on that theme, but the basic concept is quite simple: an enemy will not strike if it knows the defender can defeat the attack or can inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation" (Betts, 2013).

What Is a Nuclear Doctrine?

Nuclear doctrine is the policy of the states, which shows in what cases they will use nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon can demolish a city within some minutes after it is launched so states should have a doctrine explaining in what situation it will be used. The doctrine tells if the state contains first use policy or policy for using the nuclear weapon as retaliation after having a nuclear attack. Using nuclear weapons means destroying humans and it affects people's morale to plan this mass destruction.

What Is a Nuclear First Strike?

The nuclear first strike is a preemptive nuclear attack against an enemy who also has nuclear weapons. If the nation attacks another nation with nuclear weapons before the opponent nation uses nuclear weapons means implementing a nuclear first strike. Military planners in the U.S. and Russia still act as though each side would intentionally order a nuclear attack on the other. Thus, each side keeps hundreds of missiles with thousands of warheads at high alert, quick-launch status.

What Is a Second-strike Capability?

When a state faces a nuclear attack this means that before other parts of the country, the nuclear weapon facilities are attacked. If a country deployed some nuclear weapons that the enemy does not know or some of them are launched from nuclear submarines and can be used for a retaliatory attack, this is called second-strike capability. Besides submarines, nuclear weapons can be launched from mobile launchers, which stay covered for a long time, and it is not possible to find and demolish them. Although in a second strike attack not many missiles are used, still it can cause a disaster.

Pakistan-India Nuclear Balance

Pakistan Nuclear Arsenal

The ultimate balance in contemporary times can be linked to nuclear weapons, and to be more precise, ultimate balance means nuclear weapons. Many countries get their support from powers that have actual nuclear energy. There are two dimensions to nuclear weapons when compared to conventional military power. The first dimension is the ability of these weapons to cause complete destruction, while the second dimension can be linked to the power of these weapons to prevent wars and deter many countries (Hilali, 2012).

India has been and remains one of Pakistan's most important competitors and often sets its sights on any conventional Indian supremacy. Accordingly, nuclear weapons become of great importance to Pakistan in order to achieve its goal of out performing India on the battlefield. The importance of Pakistan's nuclear weapons did not stop there but rather served to form an impenetrable fortress that would prevent the emergence of major conventional wars. In addition to gaining unprecedented popularity in the Islamic world, it is considered the first Islamic country that was able to establish its nuclear arsenal, and this in itself is a source of pride for it (Tetraais, 2012).

Pakistan's nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India that probably triggered a January 1972 political decision (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program. Deterring India's nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan's inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. Observers point to India's 1974 "peaceful" nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program. As Pakistan lost Bangladesh (1971), to quarrantly its continuation needed the bombs. Pakistan was feeling the thread of India's nuclear weapons after the test of 1974 and this pushed it to start a nuclear program. Pakistan ex-president Musarraf (2000) said in his speeches that Islamabad would use nuclear weapons as a "last resort" in response to conventional attacks by India. Pakistan has always been saying that its nuclear weapons are for deterring any military attack from enemies (Khan 2005). "Officials stress, The use of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting tool is not a contemplated doctrine in Pakistani strategic thinking" (Khan, 2005).

Islamabad knows that if needed, China will not take any risk in the fight to help Pakistan if any conflict occurs with South Asia (Khan, 2005). On the other hand, again mutual dealings with the USA showed Islamabad that Pakistan surely cannot rely on Washington (Khan, 2005). The primary motivation of Pakistan to conduct a nuclear arsenal was to prevent the risk of major conventional war and establish an equivalent strategic balance with India (Khan, 2005). Pakistan carries the pride of being the first Muslim country who have nuclear weapons. "Pakistan's nuclear weapons program became synonymous with national sovereignty and national prestige, even when it was run by the very military that had eliminated Pakistan's best-known populist politician" (Ahmed, 1999). Pakistan restructured the nuclear program in 1999 after they had the nuclear test in 1998. The prime minister of Pakistan declare the "minimum credible deterrence (Tertrais, 2012). Pakistan started to implement a ten year plan to expand his nuclear force. Somewhere Pakistan was able to reach its nuclear threshold between 1984 and 1987, and it should be noted that Pakistan is having a military and nuclear policy, and it reorganized its nuclear program in the years between 1999-2001, after several tests in 1998, the organization and doctrine were redesigned. In May 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the principle of "minimum credible deterrence", and Islamabad worked to adopt a long-term plan to develop its nuclear

force, after the 1998 tests (Tertrais, 2012). Pakistan is implementing its second 10-year plan (2010-2020).

Table 1. Growth of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal, 2000-2022

Year	00	05	10	15	22
Estimated number of weapons	14	44	90	100	165

Source: (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 77-83).

Pakistan's expenditure on nuclear weapons programs and operations is \$2.5 billion every year. As it is shown in the above table proliferation is going to continue because of the military imbalance between Pakistan and India because Pakistan have the most faste expanding nuclear stock pile. India is dominant in its workforce, on conventional weapons. In order to establish a strategic balance, Pakistan will continue increasing its nuclear capacity.

India's Nuclear Arsenal

The main attraction of nuclear weapons is that they can limit the risk of aggressively minded states making conventional attacks on their small and weak neighbors. When a country has a stronger enemy by any means, the only way to guarantee the state not have a disaster and lose everything is to have nuclear weapons (Thakur, 2014). Surely having nuclear weapons puts a state in a safer position from external attack. It is hard to see any role for India's nuclear armaments as instruments of defense. India's no-first-use doctrine disavows the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional attacks. Nuclear-armed rivals whose mutual vulnerability to second-strike retaliatory capability guarantees that any escalation through the nuclear threshold would be mutual national suicide cannot use nuclear weapons for defense. India's nuclear arsenal offers no defense against a major conventional attack by China, Russia, or the U.S. the only three countries with the capability to do so (Thakur, 2014).

Nuclear weapons are not for defense, there for the states have them for mutual deterrence. The decision-makers should be wise enough to keep the deterrence stable. "India must also live with the nightmare possibility of jihadists getting their hands on Pakistan's nuclear weapons" (Thakur, 2014). A nuclear war can bring catastrophe to both Pakistan and India. "Indian weapons scientists are working on a successor Agni-VI missile with a 10,000-km range (that is, covering all of China) with a projected test flight date of 2017" (Thakur, 2014). India has around 90 to 110 nuclear devices and it is believed that the optimum yield of India's weapons is near 200 kilotons, which is ten times bigger than the Hiroshima bomb. Land-base missiles are predominant systems in India. India come close to having its first ballistic missile submarine called Arihant. "Arihant is significant in that it will be able to patrol far beyond the range of Pakistani anti-submarine warfare capabilities. This will essentially make India's retaliatory capability untouchable by Pakistan and thus a more credible deterrent" (Mizokami, 2014).

Pakistan- India Strategic Balance: A Comparative Assessment

In South Asia, India is the most populated country and the second most populated country in the world. India has a brilliant logistic system according to other states around the region. All small states who are neighbors of India are afraid of India because of its possibility to dominate them. "It has by far the most advanced industrial and technological base, including an indigenous armament industry that is the largest among Third World countries in value, volume, diversity of manufacture, and research and development facilities. India manufactures a wide range of equipment and it has undisputed superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons. In the absence of external support, which would strengthen Pakistan's bargaining position vis-a-vis India, and without the ability to maintain an expensive conventional force Pakistan cannot challenge India's military strength" (Hilali, 2012). India does not

have a “First use” doctrine for its nuclear armaments, only having them for retaliation after a nuclear attack (Mizokami, 2014). India also adheres to a “minimum self-defense” doctrine, where it can use limited nuclear weapons and create fruitful deterrence (Mizokami, 2014).

Table 2. Comparisons of Military Strengths of India and Pakistan

	India	Pakistan
Active Military Personnel	1,325,000	617,000
Population Reaching Military Age Annually	22,896,956	4,342,629
Active Military Reserves	2,143,000	515,000
Annual Defense Budget (USD)	46,000,000,000	7,000,000,000
Submarine Fleet Strength	17	9
Destroyer Strength	10	0
Total Navy ship Strength	184	74
Total Helicopter	504	263
Total Aircraft	1785	847
Total Aircraft carrier		
Total Tank Strength	3569	3124

Source: (Comparisons of World Military Strengths-Authored by Staff Writer).

As it is seen in the table, in population and military workforce, and equipment it is impossible to speak about an India-Pakistan military balance. “Imbalance” would be a more appropriate term since India dominates in every respect. The two nations have quite dissimilar military goals. India considers itself to be a rising regional actor, and it regards the use of military force as one component of this process. Pakistan is in an altogether different position. It seeks to provide itself with the military means to deter any pressure from India. Pakistan modernizes its armed forces but India to achieve broader strategic goals also pursues an ambitious modernization program across all of its armed services. Overall India's conventional dominance is something that Pakistan cannot match. There is a great difference in the military aspirations of the two countries. India sees itself as a rising regional actor, and military power is one element in this process.

Pakistan’s “Second Strike” Capability

Against a harmful nuclear attack, which can demolish all weapons launched inland, Pakistan is building up sea-based missiles and increasing its concern in strategic weapons to have a ‘second strike’ capability (IBNlive, 2014). Pakistan has changed its strategy toward producing nuclear warheads eligible in the Indian Ocean., using combat ships or navy submarines (IBNlive, 2014). Pakistan is having a Naval Strategic Force control since 2012 suchlike as the air force and army commands that supervise nuclear weapons (IBNlive, 2014). Nuclear analyst Shireen M. Mazari, a former director of the Pakistani government-funded Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, said, “We are on our way, and my own sense is within a year or so, we should be establishing our second-strike capabilities.” The countries will use the “Second Strike” attack pointing to the most populated places of the first attacking country; most

probably, the places will be chosen from industrial places. Wherever it is used, a limited second-strike attack would cause a calamity.

The Cold Start Doctrine and Pakistan's First Use Option In Context

Cold Start Doctrine

In later a long-time, fear-based oppressor assaults on India have driven numerous Indian policymakers to terminate that Islamabad, encouraged by its atomic obstacle, is assist specific fear-based oppressor bunches root from Pakistan who brings assaults on the Indian country. After the 2001-2002 crises India adopted the "Cold Start Doctrine" which can attack up to 50-80 km, giving no time for Pakistan or other countries to react (Tertrais, 2012: 26). The Cold Start Doctrine was adopted after the 2001-2002 crisis 2004, and it is a quick campaign with clear and specific goals, which is to capture an area of 50-80 km of land, without the need for several months to mobilize, and that would leave no time for both the international community and Pakistan to respond (Tertrais, 2012: 26). To attack first and mobilize afterwards is essentially what cold starting means. Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani(2012) said: "Cold Start would permit the Indian Army to attack before mobilizing, increasing the possibility of a sudden spiral escalation." After the Mumbai assault, India's military pioneers allegedly created a doctrine called Cold Start, which allowed Indian military forces to quickly mobilize for restricted customary strikes on the Pakistan land quickly taking after a fear-based oppressor assault. The basis was that this would donate Delhi the capacity to strike back against Pakistan without starting a full-fledged atomic war.

India will not be the primary to utilize atomic weapons, but on the off chance that it is assaulted with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear countering which is able to be enormous and outlined to incur unsatisfactory harm on its enemy. "The name on an atomic weapon utilized for assaulting India, key or strategic, is unimportant from the Indian perspective" Shyam Saran, previous Foreign Secretary and the current chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board said in a later discourse, the Times of India detailed.Saran continued by saying "Pakistani motivation is to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes such as the horrific 26/11 attack on Mumbai. What Pakistan is signaling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level. This is nothing short of nuclear blackmail, no different from the irresponsible behavior one witnesses in North Korea. in his report."

According to a cable sent on Tuesday, February 16, 2010, by US Ambassador Tim Roemer to the State Department, Washington, subject Cold Start: A mixture of myth and reality "The Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. The BJP-led government 2004 announced it, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results" (Marwat, 2017). If the Indian Cold Start Doctrine is used it has the potential to put the entire region into trouble. In case India activates its Cold Start Doctrine deterrent, will not accomplish its intended purpose. For the time being India might not perform CSD because they do not have enough weapons and tools but in the coming years obtaining the new weapons and tools would improve the military capability of India. (Ludwig III, 2007-8). This might give confidence to India to make a restrict attack on Pakistan. This plan calls for the restructuring of the Indian Army's three big striking corps into eight smaller "integrated battle groups" (IBGs), which are akin to the operational maneuver groups of the Soviet Union and

consist of motorized infantry, artillery, and armor. The eight combat groups would be ready to attack Pakistan on many occasions along various axes of progress. To provide highly mobile fire support for the IBGs' ground operations, the Indian Air Force and naval aviation forces must be integrated. India wants "bulk firepower rather than forces," according to Gurmeet Kanwal, director of the Army's Center for Land Warfare Studies. Additionally, the holding corps are now known as "pivot corps" and more would strengthen them (Ladwig III, 2008).

Nehru pointed out "The future belongs to those who produce atomic energy. That is going to be the chief national power of the future. Of course, the defense is intimately concerned with this. Even the political consequences are worthwhile" (Debak, 2012). Cold Start is an operational plan established by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited attack into Pakistani territory and get the benefit of quick penalizing Pakistan. India created Cold Start Doctrine over some terrorist attacks in which they blamed Pakistan. On the other hand, CSD will not instigate a nuclear response or endanger Pakistan. Cold Start is not a plan for the occupation of Pakistan. With the CSD India is planning to act as quick as possible to establish a decision from the army. Before other powers like USA or China, intervene on Pakistan's behalf. (Ladwig III, 2007-8) India planned not to give too much damage to Pakistan generally by using Cold Start Doctrine but demolish the military latent. The doctrine, which envisions limited war, calls for rapid mobilization to carry out punitive strikes in response to terrorist attacks by militant Islamist groups with a base in Pakistan and incursions like the 1999 infiltration of Kargil in Indian-controlled Kashmir, as well as to make territorial gains of 30-50 miles in order to secure post-conflict concessions, such as the surrender of terrorists or the closing of training camps. When it was first announced in April 2004, Cold Start drastically changed the Indian Army's inherently defensive posture (Khan, 2011).

Pakistan First Use Threat

From the beginning, the rulers of Pakistan believed that, as India is a Hindu society it decided to demolish all Muslim living in the subcontinent (Hilali, 2012). In the 1980s Pakistan established a deterrence doctrine against the conventional threat of India. As India has the superiority of conventional and nuclear weapons and at the same time dominance in regional affairs thus Pakistan wanted nuclear weapons to encounter this threat (Hilali, 2012). In the event that there are conventional attacks by India on Pakistan, it will use nuclear weapons in response to these attacks. The war can be kept away for a while, it is not unavoidable. At the end, when countries face war, a nuclear threat is there also. The war can be initiated by a simple circumstance. The contemporary situation is very earnest. India is ready to attack Pakistan after any simple incident and this will be met by a Pakistani counterattack.

India stated a "no first use" nuclear strategy although it has three times more conventional weapons than Pakistan (Hilali, 2012). On the other side because of its conventional weakness, Pakistan, openly announced a nuclear first use doctrine (Hilali, 2012). There is also the danger that once the fighting starts, an individual field commander might decide to launch a nuclear strike. Some reports suggest that Pakistan has already deployed nuclear-armed missiles in the field. Pakistan does not have the sophisticated systems that exist in the US and other Western powers to assure the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons under war conditions. According to New York Times published on 28 of May 2002, a full-scale nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill up to twelve million people immediately and cause up to seven million non-fatal casualties, according to a recent assessment by the Pentagon.

From 1998 below, stated aspects have appeared and these can be interpreted as an early Pakistani nuclear doctrine:

- i. Indo-centric minimum nuclear deterrence
- ii. Principle of massive retaliation
- iii. Policy of nuclear first-use
- iv. Counter-value nuclear targeting
- v. Delegative nuclear command and control structure (Chakma, 2006)

Debak (2012) stated, "Pakistan is also ambiguous about the nature of its first use. One option is along the time dimension. For some, the first use could be a Samson option - as a 'last resort. This may command greater legality in terms of the extreme resort in self-defense. Alternatively, as the development of the 'Nasr' suggests, it may be taken early on when the conflict is a 'low threshold mode'." Debak (2012) is continually saying that Pakistan is not sure about the kind of nuclear strike. One type is 'higher-order strike', which is for demilitarization and put down India's capability of attacking back. The places to attack could be either military places or a city.

The second type is the 'middle order' use option, it can be used when India's conventional dominance brings life-threatening attacks and it includes aggregate nuclear strikes. This option can also be used against military areas and airfields (Debak, 2012).

The last type of strike is 'lower order' first use, which is more likely a show and a demo of the nuclear weapons in the struggle (Debak, 2012). Pakistan exhibited 'Nasr', which is short-range and low yield. Nasr can be used either for demonstration strikes or to sabotage the shapes of India's attacks. Pakistan's military will increase its deterrent by waging an informational campaign centered on a low threshold projection. This makes up for any deterrent flaws or believability issues because the deterrent also works at the traditional level. Its projection of irrationality is consistent with the nuclear deterrence theory's "rationality of irrationality" premise. The goal is to frustrate and confound India. (Ahmed, 1999) The benefits and expenses of 'First use' are important. It is apparent that there are benefits but the loss might be harder. One benefit is the deterrence effect on conventional weapons in India (Ahmed, 1999). On the other hand, it makes clear the stability/ instability paradox by putting instability at the nuclear level (Ahmed, 1999). Another benefit of this first use is pushing India to consider again its nuclear counterattack and doctrine (Ahmed, 1999). According to Ahmed (1999), Pakistan should not ignore India's second-strike capabilities, which can cause insufferable harm. Ahmed (1999) continues by stating, "Secondly, there are risks in a first use intent inviting a pre-emptive strike. India is going down the BMD route. It has a multiple satellite launch capability, which over time can translate into a MIRV capability."

It is not deniable that there is a tie between nuclear weapons and conventional military potentiality. If a country is weaker in conventional warfare vis-à-vis a nuclear-equipped opponent, it leans on a 'first use' scheme to overcome and stop a conventional armed army. Pakistan is having this kind of circumstance.

Conclusion

Indian leaders were aware that the Cold Start, to some extent, was planned to penalize Pakistan without engendering a nuclear response. They, however, could not be certain about whether Pakistani leaders' would respond in the desired way.

Cold Start is not the single or ideal option for Indian leaders after a terrorist attack. India might prefer not to respond or opt for one of the several other alternatives based on the characteristics of the attack including the nature, locality, causality, or timing of the attack and the strength of the public response. Although Cold Start is an innovative attempt to find a military solution to address India's security challenges on its western border, the problems India faces are not only military but also political in nature. Hence, it cannot guarantee that India would achieve its strategic aims through a limited war. Pakistan's assumptions about Cold Start, on the other hand, are focused on the conjecture that any offensive attack from India would not leave enough time for diplomatic means to operate and that such attacks would be able to onset or encourage a nuclear response. However, since some of the core areas of Pakistan, especially those that are in the plains of Punjab, are close to the borders and their asymmetric location provides an advantage to India, Cold Start turns out to be a dangerous idea. Similarly, the Pakistani Army could also occupy the disputed locations faster than India would grant Pakistan the ability to prevent a Cold Start. Any destruction of Indian nuclear stocks would favorably affect not only India's security but also its other national and international interests including financial interests, development, and social welfare.

Pakistan's perpetual goal of reaching military parity or "strategic balance" with India deteriorated Pakistan's economic condition without bringing any security. Rather than solely focusing on this, Pakistan and Pakistanis could be better off by redirecting its resources and efforts to other strategic aims

such as a stable political environment, a healthy economy, and a balance between civil and military sectors. It is not difficult to guess that if any war occurs between India and Pakistan it will be a full-scale war at air and sea and may be very limited at the ground; and this might block all the ports of Pakistan ports. In case India crosses a delineated border or a river, attacks main cities or strategic targets like dams, nuclear depots, or destruct Pakistani armed forces, Pakistan would obviously opt for its nuclear weapons first. In addition to these, if India blocks the transportation of essential supplies, or crosses the line of control in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan would undoubtedly use its nuclear weapons as an immediate response.

Although the first use of nuclear power is ingrained in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, the information about the content of the doctrine is less revealing than the consensus about its nature. Unlike India, Pakistan has not declared its nuclear doctrine and has not subscribed to No First Use. Therefore, one cannot be sure that Pakistan's current nuclear doctrine is one of nuclear first use. Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons is what all indicators suggest. First Pakistan aims to discourage any Indian attack, nuclear or conventional through nuclear means, as it would also offset its conventional disadvantages. Secondly, Pakistan has not subscribed to NFU and as revealed by Wikileaks, General Kayani is not in consensus with the President with regard to NFU subscription. In addition, the statements from important Pakistani personages indicate a possibility of escalation in case of a conventional conflict between the two countries. Furthermore, the control over the nuclear attack is with the military and thus the development of conventional weapons is more likely to be in line with the nuclear stockpile than it would otherwise be. Lastly, the military control of the nuclear deterrent through service-specific strategic commands points to Pakistan's possible readiness to bring it to completion. Pakistan's nuclear use doctrine has led to an escalation in the previous two crises, and Pakistan is likely to use a similar preventive stance in possible future crises with India. At last, it is obvious that if Pakistan faces any intimidation from the Indian military, Pakistan has no other chance than to use the 'First Strike Use' threat and mobilize all military capabilities to prevent India's military attack.

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