



REVISITING THE CONDITIONS OF THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT
ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPE DURING
EUROPEANIZATION PERIOD: A FUZZY-SET APPROACH

POPULİST RADİKAL SAĞ PARTİLERİN SEÇİM BAŞARILARINDA AVRUPALILAŞMA
SÜRECİNİN ETKİSİNİN YENİDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ: 2000-2010 ORTA VE DOĞU
AVRUPA SEÇİMLERİ

Abstract

The Populist Radical Right parties (PRR) in Central and East European countries (CEECs) are skeptical about supporting the European Union membership. In the 1990s seldom did the PRR electoral success occur in CEECs that engaged in the fourth enlargement of the European Union. In the first decade of the millennium, however, this situation changed and the PRR achieved significant electoral success in most countries. Applying a new methodological approach based on fuzzy-set analysis, this study revisits under which context the PRR achieved electoral success in the period from 2000 to 2010. This study concludes: first, right wing mainstream parties' positive stance on the issue of EU-membership benefitted the PRR in parliamentary elections held during the period 2000 to 2010. Second, the presence of a notable Roma population was context-setting condition: the policy divergence between right-wing mainstream party and the PRR, along with the unemployment problem (unlike the corruption problem) helped the latter, if a notable Roma population exists (e.g., Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia). In countries without a significant number of Roma populations (e.g., Poland and Slovenia), the PRR electoral success occurred when the right-wing mainstream parties pursued socially illiberal policies despite its support for the EU membership.

Mustafa Çağatay ASLAN*

* Dr. Öğr. Görevlisi, İstanbul
Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler
Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve
Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

E-posta/E-mail:

mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr

Orcid: 0000-0003-3384-1642

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Öz

Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerindeki popülist radikal sağ partiler, ülkelerinin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyeliğine karşı şüpheli bir tutum içinde olmuşlardır. Avrupa Birliği'nin dördüncü genişleme sürecinin parçası olan Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde 1990'lı yıllarda radikal sağ partiler dikkat çekecek seçim başarısı elde edememişlerdir. Milenyumun ilk on yılında ise bu durum değişmiş ve popülist radikal sağ partiler çoğu ülkede önemli seçim başarısı kazanmışlardır. Bu çalışma, söz konusu dönem özelinde (2000-2010), küme-teorik yaklaşım üzerine geliştirilmiş muğlak-küme analizi yöntemini kullanarak, popülist radikal sağ partilerin hangi koşullar altında seçim başarısı elde ettiklerini tartışmaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları şunlardır: Birincisi, ana akım sağ partilerin AB üyeliğine destek vermeleri, 2000-2010 döneminde yapılan parlamento seçimlerinde popülist radikal sağ partilere yaramıştır. İkincisi, kayda değer bir Roman nüfusun varlığı bağlam belirleyen bir koşul olmuştur. Özellikle Romanların yoğun olarak yaşadıkları ülkelerde (örneğin Bulgaristan, Macaristan, Romanya, Slovakya) ana akım sağ partilerle popülist radikal sağ partiler arasındaki politika farklılığı olduğunda

işsizlik sorunu ile birlikte bu durum popülist radikal sağ partilere yaramıştır. Romanların sayıca az olduğu ülkelerde (örneğin Polonya ve Slovenya), popülist radikal sağ partilerin seçim başarısı, ana akım sağ partilerin AB üyeliğini desteklemelerine rağmen sosyal açıdan liberal olmayan politikalar izlemesiyle gerçekleşmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Radikal Sağ, Avrupalılaşıma, Populizm, Etnik Milliyetçilik, Seçim Rekabeti.

Introduction

Uncompromisingly supportive of nativist and authoritarian policies, the populist radical right parties (PRR) are highly critical of any attempts in pursuit of increasing individual autonomy and antithetical to the principles of liberal democracy. In the 1990s, seldom did the PRR win a significant portion of the votes in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In the first decade of the new millennium, in which the countries engaged into the fourth enlargement of the European Union (EU), by contrast, the PRR received more votes. To give a few examples: the leader of the Greater Romania Party (GRP), Vadim Tudor, won 28.3% of the vote and qualified for the second round in the presidential election of 2000. Receiving 8.1% of the vote, ATAKA became a parliamentary party in Bulgaria in 2005, and its leader, Volen Siderov, won 24% of the votes in the second round of the presidential election of 2006. The League of Polish Families (LPF), securing 34 seats in the Sejm, emerged as a coalition partner from the 2005 parliamentary election, as did the Slovak National Party (SNS) with 11.7% a year later. Winning slightly over 6% in 2004, the Slovene National Party reached its peak since 1996 (Rose & Munro 2009). Jobbik in Hungary won 16.7% of the votes in the parliamentary election of 2010 (Batory, 2010:7). Why did the PRR perform better in CEECs in the period of Europeanization, in which the countries were expected to fulfill membership requirements fueling the democratization process?

Stemming from the incipient influence of the issue of EU membership on the electoral preferences in the phase of the accession negotiations, Europeanization could affect the party system mechanics in the EU candidate countries. Unless the majority of citizens oppose the EU membership, the issue is likely to turn into a valence issue, on which the mainstream parties' stances would converge. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001, for instance, indicated that about eighty-four per cent of citizens were not opposed to the EU membership. While the right-wing mainstream party would be busy proving its competence to surmount the obstacles to EU membership, a niche in the party system could emerge, readily filled by the nativist PRR as the progenitor of opposition to EU membership. This reasoning follows Kitschelt's hypothesis (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995) expecting that the convergence between mainstream parties of the left and right allows "economically neo-liberal" and "culturally authoritarian" PRR parties to achieve electoral success in West European countries since the mid-1980s. Moreover, considering the political criteria for EU membership such as the respect for minority rights and human rights, pro-membership stance would not be compatible with a position favoring the traditional, authoritarian and nationalist socio-cultural policies within the country, otherwise would lead to a political aberration. On the contrary, the PRR could capitalize on the harmony between its opposition to EU membership and traditional, authoritarian and nationalist policies. In addition, the unemployment problem and endemic corruption could contribute to a climate favoring the PRR that accuses politicians of enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people and denigrates the Roma people as scapegoats for cultural and economic problems. Through a fuzzy-set approach, this study contributes to emerging comparative studies on PRR in CEECs for addressing the puzzle about under which combination of the conditions (i.e configurations) the PRR achieved electoral success. The PRR's electoral success in CEECs have not been analyzed on the basis of the fuzzy-set approach, though the approach has been used in the other studies focusing on different party families (e.g., Hanley & Sikk, 2016; Lilliefeldt, 2012; Ishiyama & Batta, 2011; Veugelers & Magnan, 2005). The fsQCA is useful for comparing small to medium

number of cases (10 to 50), testing the necessity of each condition for the outcome, and discussing the puzzle on the basis of the intermediate solution term, which is derived from not only the actual cases but also theoretical cases, referring to theory-guided configurations that would be expected to yield the outcome, if existing (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012:8–9). This study, however, does not discuss the profiles of the PRR votes because the fsQCA is not capable of analyzing the individual-level variables such as socioeconomic status or left-right ideological self-placement. Nor does this study go beyond the period 2000 to 2010, when right-wing mainstream parties have substantially got free from the EU's influence, typified by prevailing authoritarian tendencies in Fidesz or Law and Justice Party. Also, this study excludes the Baltic countries in which major political parties, including the PRR, construed membership to EU and NATO as safeguards against the Russian influence. For the period 2000 to 2010, the result of the analysis of the twenty-parliamentary elections, held in seven CEECs that became EU member either in 2004 or 2007, concludes: first, right wing mainstream parties' support for the EU membership benefitted the PRR in parliamentary elections held particularly just before and after the EU accession; second, the presence of a notable Roma population was context-setting condition in that it decides whether the policy divergence between right-wing mainstream party and the PRR, along with the unemployment problem (unlike the corruption problem) helped the latter to achieve an electoral success. In the absence of a notable Roma population, the presence of a right-wing mainstream party with socially illiberal policies in spite of its support for EU membership led to the occurrence of the PRR electoral success. The first section of this article reviews the core features of the PRR. The second section briefly explains the fuzzy-set QCA and the calibration of the raw data on both outcome and conditions. The article is concluded by a discussion on the necessity of each condition for the occurrence of the PRR electoral success (*test of necessity*) and the configurations that are sufficient (*test of sufficiency*) to yield the PRR electoral success.

1. Defining the Populist Radical Right: The Most Common Features

Scholarly disagreement persists about how to label the parties in question in the literature. Some studies use loose terms such as mythical right, far-right, extreme right, neo-fascist, or new populist, whereas other studies invoke relatively confined terms such as anti-immigrant, new radical right, radical right, or populist radical right. This study prefers the term 'populist radical right', since it captures more explicitly the core features that have been mentioned frequently in the literature. First, the parties are deemed 'right-wing' with their understanding that the cultural and economic inequalities between people are natural, not artificial. This outlook leads them to believe nativist nationalism, arguing in favor of confining nationality to ethnically or religiously homogeneous native groups, and against involving non-native groups or ideas regarded as detrimental to the nation's homogeneity (Mudde, 2007:19). Second, these parties are 'radical' for envisioning an ethno-centric 'true community', to which belonging requires unquestioning obedience to established traditions. A particularly negative reaction against social diversity involves a strong state that should take punitive action towards people whose behaviors allegedly fall outside traditional ways of life (Rydgren, 2007:243). Third, the parties are 'populist' for manifesting their ethos with the aim of cultivating public resentment with politics. Employing the rhetoric of anti-establishment, the parties are highly critical of the 'self-seeking' political elites, which nationalist-populist circles perceive as ignorant of what they consider the 'general will' of the 'homogenous' and 'virtuous' people.

1.1. Fuzzy-Set Approach: The PRR Electoral Success

This analysis of twenty-parliamentary elections provides the snapshot of the multiple pathways for PRR electoral success. Unlike the inferential methods, the QCA, which is set-theoretical and conjunctural in its logic, is satisfactory not only to identify the contextual conditions under which the PRR electoral success occurred but also to discuss if any of the

conditions (factor or explanatory variable) are necessary component of the conjunctural causality. In fsQCA, the raw data on the outcome and each of the conditions should be refined through a theory-guided calibration, converting the raw-data into fuzzy-set membership scores, taking a value between 0 and 1. The fuzziness in the set-membership of qualitative judgment (e.g., the extent of the electoral success) should be clarified through theory-guided quantitative comparisons. Then, for qualitative differences in the set-membership three benchmarks (or the anchors) should be set: full membership [1.0], non-full membership [0.0], and the crossover point [0.5], which corresponds to “maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is more in or more out of the target set” (Ragin, 2008:90). This should be followed by a decision for the baseline of quantitative comparisons within the qualitatively same set-membership. The next section explains 1) how the PRR electoral success was conceptualized, 2) how the raw-data on PRR electoral success was calibrated. This is followed by a review of studies to clarify the theoretical guidance behind the selection of the conditions, expected to work on the PRR electoral success, and the decision for setting the benchmarks on which the calibration was operated.

1.1.1. Outcome: PRR Electoral Success

Being placed most on the authoritarian along libertarian-authoritarian continuum the PRR is primarily interested in promoting ideology rather than maximizing their electoral support, unlike the catchall parties. The PRR, therefore, falls into the category of minor-party, which is inclusive of the parties that are almost eliminated from acquiring parliamentary majority. Despite this apparent weakness, the PRR can gain political significance, particularly in parliamentary systems, if they secure parliamentary seats, which could allow them to play even a decisive role in coalition formations or in crucial legislative voting (Sartori, 1976:122-123; Meguid, 2005:348). Following this reasoning, the PRR, which emerges as a parliamentary party from elections, was considered “electorally successful” in this analysis. To secure parliamentary seats, political parties competing in the proportional representation electoral system are required to exceed the national electoral threshold, which was equal to 4 or 5% in the elections covered in this analysis. The anchor point used in determining the PRR with full membership (membership score of 1) to the set of *electorally successful PRR parties* was set at the level of 10%. With full non-membership (the membership score of 0) the anchor point was set at 2%. The crossover value (membership score of 0.5) was set electoral threshold minus 0.01%. Table 1 shows the percentage of PRR’s electoral support and their membership scores in *the set of electorally successful PRR parties* for each of twenty elections.

Table 1: Electoral Support for PRR in CEE (2000-2010)

ELECTION	VOTES %	Set Membership in <i>SUCCESS</i>
BUL2005	8.1	0.8
BUL2009	9.3	0.8
CZE2002	1	0
CZE2006	0.33	0
CZE2010	0.03	0
HUN2002	4.4	0.4
HUN2006	2.2*	0.2
HUN2010	16.7	1
POL2001	7.9	0.8
POL2005	8.0	0.8
POL2007	1.1	0
ROM2000	19.5	1
ROM2004	13.5	1

ROM2008	3.2	0.4
SNS2002_ Slovak	3.3	0.4
SNS2006	11.7	1
SNS2010	5.1	0.6
SNS2000_ Slovenia	4.4	0.6**
SNS2004	6.3	0.6
SNS2008	5.4	0.6

* Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) and the JOBBIK formed an electoral alliance in the 2006.

** With the exceptions of Slovenia and Bulgaria, the electoral threshold is 5 per cent in all countries. The electoral threshold in Bulgaria and Slovenia is 4 %.

1.1.2. Conditions: Unemployment, Perceived Corruption and Ethnic Minority

Scheuch and Klingemann's normal pathology approach, which has been adopted in many studies on the PRR, holds the view that the PRR is the product of the large-scale economic and cultural changes in the industrial societies of the West Europe (Mudde, 2010: 1169). With transition to advanced industrial societies, Flanagan argues that, as a reaction to new left value-based issues, the salience of new right value-based issues, such as "support for traditional moral and religious values, a strong defense, patriotism, law and order, opposition to immigration and minority rights and respect for the traditional symbols and offices of authority" increased also (Inglehart & Flanagan 1987:1306). Likewise, Ignazi (1992:6, 24) suggests, "... the extreme right parties derive from reaction to [silent revolution]," and they have been provided with favorable conditions for their rise with the enlargement of political space stipulated by the non-responsiveness of the established system to growing concerns over issues such as immigration and security. Applying the normal pathology thesis to CEE countries, Minkenberg (2002:355-356) emphasizes that the cost-driven ambivalence towards the new order, which was established by the political, economic and social transformation after the collapse of the communist regimes, was conducive to the PRR electoral success. Similarly, Anatasakis (2002:3) argues, "the emergence and resilience of radical right forces in [CEECs] should be seen primarily as a reaction to the transition process. The PRR capitalizes on the negative consequences of any processes of the rapid changes, and this invokes the notion of the 'protest voters,' what Van der Brug and Fennema (2009:593) describe as those "who support a party out of discontent..." In her study that focuses on the extreme right voting in CEECs for the 2003-2006 period, Bustikova (2009:232) argues, "... supports for extreme right is associated with the non-accountability of political leaders and corruption." The New Democracy Barometer of 2005 counts corruption, among the other factors, that erode public confidence in the parliamentarians and political parties (Mingui-Pippidi, 2007:11-12). The other underlying condition of the public dissatisfaction with the transition process is the mismanagement of economics, one indicative of which is the high level of unemployment (Anatasakis, 2002:5).

Although the transition-based explanation, underlining the protest voters, is informative in order to explain the electoral demand for the PRR, its main deficiency is its underestimation of the 'policy-voters,' who support a political party out of their policy approval. Particularly in CEECs where the ethnic diversity may provide fertile ground for ethno-populism, the populist parties, the PRR is a sub-set of which, could hinder democratic institutions from being entrenched. For being virulent critics of the transformation process and being supportive of nativist nationalism, the PRR parties can appeal both "protest-voters" and "policy-voters." From a set-theoretic perspective, PRR electoral success should be more likely to occur in elections with membership scores higher than 0.5 to the following three sets: 1) elections held in countries with large ethnic minority population (ETHPOP); 2) elections held at the time of high unemployment (UNEMP); and 3) elections held at the time of high perceived corruption (CORR).

Norris (2005) suggests that ethnic minority can barely be a convincing target for the PRR in countries where the ethnic minorities compose less than 5% of the country population. Nevertheless, based on the deterrence logic, Bustikova and Kitschelt argue that hatred of an ethnic minority group, which is too strong in numbers with a high potential of influencing the politics of a country, would be a precarious sentiment (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009:468). For example, the incitement of ethnic Latvians to target at Russian minority, who constitute nearly a quarter of the country's population and can receive political and economic support from their kin state (i.e., Russia), may lead to "serious consequences." Likewise, Turks in Bulgaria and Hungarians in Slovakia or Romania can also be regarded as the ethnic minorities against whom the PRR may hesitate to mobilize their electorate. On the contrary, the Roma people, lacking political and economic power, and a kin state to influence the politics of the countries in which they live, are an easy target for the PRR parties. Combining these arguments, the analysis sets the crossover point at the level of 5% and assigns a fuzzy-set score of more than 0.5 for elections held in countries with a Roma population more than 5%. In terms of the elections covered in this study the data indicate that Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, nearly 10% of the country populations of which is constituted by the Roma people, should be assigned a membership score of 1; and Hungary, in which the Roma people are estimated to compose more than 5% but less than 8 % of the country population, should be assigned a membership score of 0.8. Roma people compose less than 2% of the national population in the Czech Republic and less than 1% in Poland and Slovenia; accordingly, this condition should be given a membership score of 0.2 and 0, respectively, for the elections held in Czech Republic and those in Poland and Slovenia.

In his study on the relationship between sectorial shifts and cyclical unemployment, Lillien concludes, "Even in the periods of stable aggregate employment, continuous labor reallocation in the United States results in almost 5 percent of employment leaving old jobs for new ones every month. Because it takes time for separated workers to be matched to the jobs, some positive level of unemployment will always exist" (Lillien, 1982:777). Following this conclusion, the threshold for full non-membership to the set of UNEMP was set at level of 4%, corresponding to the equilibrium rate of unemployment in free market economies. Fidrmuc underlines the unemployment level reaching to double-digits in CEEC in the 1990s as a condition affecting the political parties' electoral performances (Fidrmuc, 2000:212). Drawing on this finding, the threshold level for full membership to the set of UNEMP was set at the level of 10%. The crossover point is set at the level of 7%, which represents the middle point between the thresholds for full membership and for full non-membership to this set. To determine the benchmarks for the set of CORR, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2001), which places the countries on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 represents the most corrupt polity, was utilized. The threshold for full non-membership to this set was set at 80, which is the closest integer to the score of Norway where corruption is not a salient issue. The threshold for full membership to the set was set at 20, which is the closest integer to the average scores for Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, where the problem of corruption has been very pervasive. The crossover point was set at 50, corresponding the mid-point of the scale.

The electoral successes of the PRR in CEECs were rather limited in the 1990s in spite of the transformation-induced pressures and insecurities. This implies that the explanations for the puzzle on the PRR electoral success should take into account the PRR's near-by competitors' stance on the issues that are salient to PRR. What common to the PRR are the socio-cultural policies rather than socioeconomic policies, which are, as Mudde (2007:132) argues, secondary to them. Bundling the socio-cultural policies supporting traditional, moral and religious values while opposing individual and ethnic minority rights, and the EU integration, the PRR takes a position on the authoritarian side of the noneconomic dimension of the party competition, which, as Marks et al. (2006:157) suggest, "is almost as powerful as the economic Left/Right [in Poland, Romania and Slovenia] and it is stronger [in Hungary]." Whether this position brings a PRR

electoral success should partly be influenced by two interrelated conditions: 1) the salience level of the issues for which PRR could claim ownership; 2) the way of the interaction (policy divergence or policy convergence) between the right-wing mainstream party and the PRR in terms of the socio-cultural issues and the EU membership.

The party systems in the CEECs have similarities and yet the variance of the issue salience, depending on the country-specific aspects, causes variations (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009:307). To put it succinctly, with respect to the period from early 1990s to the mid-2000s, against the backdrop of the communist legacy, party positions followed a predictable pattern across the CEECs: the political parties supporting free-market systems tended to take affirmative positions also on ethnic minority rights or EU membership; whereas, those with leftist socioeconomic position were inclined to oppose ethnic minority rights or the EU membership (Marks et. al., 2006:162-164). Nevertheless, the issue salience varies from one country to another and the political parties are more likely to emphasize the unresolved issues; for instance, the salience of the democratization issue is higher in countries with less developed democratic institutions than in countries where drastic steps towards consolidated democracy have been taken (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009: 307). This reasoning explains the predominance of the anti-communist versus communist divide in the party competition in many CEECs until the reformation of the communist parties (e.g., in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) or the disappearance of their relevancies to government formulations (e.g., in Czech Republic). In their process-tracing analysis of the party systems' evolution in CEE, for instance, Enyedi and Bertoa (2011:123) suggest, "... [In Hungary] the discourse and political preferences tended to be structured in a bipolar way: during the first months evolving around communist vs. anti-communist divide, after that around the cultural differences splitting conservatives and (social) liberals." In a similar vein, the ethnicity should emerge as a salient issue in the CEECs in which the ethnicity-based mobilization rather than bourgeoisie-based or liberalism-based movements established the nationhood in the late 19th and early 20th century and the authoritarian regimes in the interwar era, and the communist regimes after the second World War interfered with the possible subsequent development of a "political nation" through a liberal democracy.

The fuzzy-set analysis is unable to measure which issues were salient during the period it concerns. Nevertheless, there are studies addressing this subject. In her study covering parliamentary elections held in CEECs between 2003 and 2006, for instance, Bustikova (2009:235) argues that "cross-national support for the extreme right can be seen as a reaction to convergence between the major political parties on the most salient issue of the 1990s: joining the EU." Divergent public views on the issue of joining the EU became pronounced particularly as accession negotiation was nearing completion when it became more obvious that adapting to EU norms and rules was by no means a benefit to all citizens. Vachudova and Hooghe (2009: 192), for instance, hold the view that "as accession is linked with difficult reforms, the perceived costs for organized groups such as workers or farmers enter the national debate." In addition, the EU accession referenda held in all CEECs except Bulgaria and Romania also contributed to the salience of the issue of joining the EU (Netjes & Binnema, 2007:47).

In the model developed by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004:750) the level of the public awareness about the issue of European membership was stated as either high (Slovenia) or medium/high (Poland and Slovakia), unlike the Czech Republic (low/medium) and Hungary (low). De Vries and Tillman's study on the salience of EU issue voting in 19 EU countries, including all CEECs covered in this analysis, concluded that "the strength of the EU issue on individual preferences is stronger in East and Central Europe than West Europe." The distinctiveness of the PRR parties' illiberal socio-cultural policies and opposition to EU can be blurred unless the other parties ignore it (Minkenberg, 2002:356-359). During the much of the 1990s, for instance, the Eurosceptic policies were pursued by the PRR and the unreformed

communist parties (Beichelt, 2004: 30); yet, the nationalist voters, in countries including Bulgaria and Romania, overwhelmingly voted for the unreformed communist parties, which were the major players of the party systems. Similarly, the PRR parties were not alone in pursuing illiberal cultural policies in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where the rapid transformation of the communist parties into social democratic ones substantially diminished the statist-economy versus market-economy cleavage between the mainstreams of the left and right, which diverged on cultural policies correspondingly (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009). Nevertheless, the Europeanization process affected the party system mechanics in a way that it created a niche for opposition to the EU membership. The process, for instance, accelerated the transformation of the unreformed communist parties in Bulgaria and Romania. In both countries, once they had lost the office to the set of pro-EU political parties in 1996 and 1997 respectively, the former communist parties, combining nationalism and economic populism, transformed into social democratic parties. Vachudova (2008:401), for instance, argues, “shedding ethnic nationalism and focusing their political energies on economically centre-left and socially more liberal programs, Romania’s Social Democratic Party governed from 2000 to 2004 and Bulgaria’s BSP [governed from 2005 to 2009].” The electoral competition between the mainstream parties were constrained by the standardized criteria for the EU membership and therefore the elections performed the function of choosing which political party would achieve the membership requirements rather than deciding which policies would be followed (Grzymalala-Busse & Innes, 2003:66). In Hungary, for example, the social democrat’s handling of the EU accession negotiations was criticized by the right-wing mainstream party, Fidesz, which did not certainly oppose being part of the EU at the time (Szczurbiak & Taggart, 2004:756). At most, the right-wing mainstream parties with a tendency for supporting illiberal cultural policies such as the Law and Justice Party in Poland took a position on the issue of European integration what Szczurbiak qualifies as “Euroneutral” (Szczurbiak, 2001:108). This favoured the PRR as suggested in Nanou and Dorussen’s (2013:83) study: “As EU constraints increase in an issue arena parties moderate their positions and adopt positions closer to those of their rival. At the same time, ... parties that do not belong to the mainstream party families or eurosceptic parties does not obviously lead to increased policy convergence.” Grzymalala-Busse and Innes (2003:64) suggest, “The demands of the [EU] enlargement have both constrained responsive and accountable party competition ... and encouraged populists and demagogues.” The Slovak National Party was “Euro-reject,” which, in Kopecky and Mudde words, notifies the parties that are “deeply distrustful of both the ideas underlying European integration and the EU itself.” The Life and Justice Party in Hungary and the League of Polish Families officially called for a NO vote in the EU accession referenda. Whereas the major parties in Slovenia called for a Yes vote, the Slovenian National Party remained aloof (Szczurbiak & Taggart, 2004:755-758). Thus, for the period this analysis concerns, the PRR electoral success should occur in elections in which right wing mainstream parties belonged to the following sets: 1) right wing mainstream party with socially liberal policies (*LIBM*), 2) political parties supporting the issue of joining the EU (*EPHILM*).

To decide which mainstream parties should be included in the analysis, this study utilizes the Chapel Hill Expert Survey series that were conducted in 2002, 2006 and 2010. This survey asks the country-experts to place the national political parties, by using a ten-point scale, on two dimensions of party competition: 1) left versus right economic dimension; 2) green-alternative-libertarian (*GAL*) versus traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (*TAN*) cultural (or noneconomic) dimension. On this scale, the position that is equal to 1 refers to the most ‘*GAL*’ position whereas the position that is equal to 10 stands for the most ‘*TAN*’ position (Hooghe et al., 2010; Bakker, et al., 2015). As mentioned earlier, the socio-cultural policies are of primary importance and common to the PRR; correspondingly, the mainstream parties whose position on this dimension, with respect to the period 2000 to 2010, was closest to that of the PRR parties were included in the analysis. These mainstream parties were: Bulgaria Socialist Party (*BSP*), Civic Democratic Party (*ODS*) in Czech Republic, Fidesz in Hungary, Law and Justice Party (*PiS*) in Poland, Social

Democratic Party in Romania, Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, and Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS). On a 10-point scale, a position equal to 5 or below applies to mainstream parties with full membership to the set of *LIBM* (1.0), whereas the position that is equal to 10 notifies the mainstream parties with full non-membership score (0.0) The cross-over point was set at 7.5.

Mainstream parties' position on the issue of the European integration is also detected through Chapel Hill expert surveys. The survey estimates the parties' position on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor). To set the anchor points for full membership and full non-membership, this study draws on the literature related party-based Euroscepticism, which classifies the ODS as the leading Eurosceptic mainstream party and the SDKU as the leading Euroenthusiast party in terms of the period 2000 to 2010. (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002:306, 315). Following this, the ODS's position, which is on the 2nd point of the scale, can be set as the benchmark for the full non-membership, while the position of the SDKU, which was on the 6th point, can be set as the anchor point for the full membership to the set of *EPHILM*. The mid-point of the scale – the 4th point - referring to a neuter position was set at the crossover point for this set (see: Appendix 1).

2. Empirical Analysis: The Analysis of Necessity

The software fsQCA-3.0 was utilized for analyzing the *success* in relation to the five conditions. Before revealing the sufficient path(s) leading to the PRR's electoral success, the analysis should begin with the test of necessity, the purpose of which is to decide any of the conditions must exist if the outcome occurs (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 231). Applying to this study, the PRR electoral success should not occur in the absence of the necessary condition(s). To avoid the pitfall called false necessary condition a two-step procedure should be followed in the test of necessity. First, the result of the test should be examined to see any of the conditions have a consistency score higher than the recommended minimum consistency score, which is 0.90. If any, second step should revise each "truth table" row without this condition to control that the outcome did not occur in its absence. Even a single row conflicting with the first-step of the test of necessity prevents this analysis from declaring the condition as a necessary one. Table 2, showing the result of the test of necessity, indicates that only one condition has a consistency score higher than 0.90: *ephilm* (0.927). Nevertheless, the sixth row in the truth table, showed in Table 3, conflicts with the expectation that the PRR electoral success should not occur when the right-wing mainstream party is not a member of the set of *EPHILM*. Here, the League of Polish Families achieved an electoral success in 2005 even though the Law and Justice Party, which no longer felt obliged to downplay its Euroscepticism once the EU membership had been granted in 2004, took a Eurosceptic stance. Thus, the test of necessity revealed that none of the included conditions was necessary for the occurrence of the PRR parties' electoral success in CEECs in the period 2000 to 2010. The obvious outcome of this test of necessity is that the PRR parties achieved electoral success under more than a single path, which consists of different conditions.

Table 2: Test of necessity

Condition	Consistency	Coverage
UNEMP	0.836	0.638
~ UNEMP	0.327	0.642
CORR	0.763	0.724
~ CORR	0.563	0.738
ETHPOP	0.672	0.672
~ETHPOP	0.363	0.444
LIBM	0.8	0.647
~LIBM	0.454	0.781
EPHILM	0.927	0.68
~EPHILM	0.2	0.44

2.1. Test of Sufficiency in Fuzzy-set QCA: Solution terms for PRR Electoral Success

The analysis of the truth-table having thirty-two rows, each of which shows the “AND combinations” between the five conditions with respect to the PRR’s electoral success, is examined to reveal the paths (snapshot of the configuration in elections) that were sufficient for the occurrence of the PRR electoral success in the CEECs during the period 2000 to 2010. As shown in Table 3, the twenty parliamentary elections included in this study fall into ten of the thirty-two truth-table rows; thereby, leaving twenty-two rows without empirical evidence, which are called as “remainders” or “counterfactuals.” The counterfactuals matter, since the three solution terms produced by the test of sufficiency and known as “conservative solution term”, “parsimonious solution term”, and “intermediate solution term” differ from each other in their treatment of the counterfactuals. For instance, in the formulation of the conservative term, all counterfactuals were excluded, whereas in that of the parsimonious solution term, they are included through supposing them to be conducive to the occurrence of the outcome. In the formulation of the intermediate solution term, the counterfactuals that are expected to yield PRR electoral success on the basis of the existing findings in the literature are included. In the formulation of all three terms, the QCA’s handling of the truth table rows with empirical evidence is the same: all rows with a consistency score higher than 0.75 are included, whereas those with lesser consistency score are excluded (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012:279). Table 3 shows included and excluded truth-table rows with empirical evidence in the formulation of all solution terms.

Table 3: Truth table rows with empirical evidence

Unemp	Corr	Ethpop	Libm	Ephilm	Cases	Row's Consistency	INCLUDED ROWS
0	0	0	0	1	SLV2008	0.875	
1	1	0	0	1	POL2001	0.857	
1	1	1	1	1	BUL2005 HUN2010 ROM2000 SLK2002 SLK2006 SLK2010	0.833	
1	0	1	1	1	HUN2006	0.77	
0	1	1	0	1	HUN2002	0.70	EXCLUDED ROWS
1	1	0	0	0	POL2005 POL2007	0.69	
0	1	1	1	1	BUL2009 ROM2004 ROM2008	0.687	
1	0	0	1	1	SLV2004	0.684	
0	0	0	1	1	SLV2000	0.666	
1	1	0	1	0	CZE2002 CZE2006 CZE2010	0.411	

2.2. Intermediate Solution Term for PRR Electoral Success in CEE: 2000 to 2010

As in the other QCA studies, the discussion on the findings is based on the intermediate solution term. Remember that the term is produced by the truth table rows with a consistency score higher than 0.75 and the theory-guided counterfactuals, being conducive to the PRR's electoral success, if they existed (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012:169). In the selection of the theory-guided counterfactuals, the theoretical assumption is as follows: Given the findings in the earlier studies, at the conjuncture of the consequences of the transition process and Europeanization process in the CEECs, the electoral demand for the PRR parties would be high in countries where at least one of three aspects exists: Roma population, unemployment, and corruption. Also, heeding on the spatial theory of party competition, the PRR parties will have a chance of materializing electoral success, if right-wing mainstream parties pursue socially liberal cultural policies and are either Euroenthusiats or "Europragmatists" on the issue of the European integration. Thus, the intermediate solution term is reached on the basis of the truth table rows with a consistency score above 0.75 and all counterfactuals meeting the said theoretical expectations (see appendix 2 for conservative and parsimonious solution terms).

The intermediate solution term produced two different paths, presented in Table 4. The first path combines three conditions: the presence of a Europhile mainstream party, the absence of right-wing mainstream party with liberal cultural policies, and the absence of a notable Roma population: $ephilm^* \sim libm^* \sim ethpop$. The path covers the electoral success of the LPR in 2001 and that of the SNS in Slovenia in 2008. The second path consists of four conditions: high levels of unemployment, notable Roma population, a right-wing mainstream party with liberal cultural policies, and a Europhile right-wing mainstream party ($ephilm^* ethpop^* libm^* unemp$). The path covers the electoral success of the SNS in Slovakia in 2006 and 2010 elections, that of the PRM in 2000 election, that of ATAKA in 2005 election and that of the JOBBIK in 2010 election. The two deviant cases, in which the PRR parties did not achieve electoral success despite a favorable

configuration exists, are: the electoral failure of the SNS in Slovakia) in 2002 and that of the PRM in 2008 election. The uncovered cases, which fall into truth table rows with a consistency score less than 0.75, are: PRM’s electoral success in 2004, the SNS’s electoral success in Slovenia in 2000 and 2004 elections, LPR’s electoral success in 2005 election and the ATAKA’s electoral success in 2009. Finally, the SPR-RSC, which had never achieved electoral success during the period, were not covered, as the truth table row including this party has a consistency score less than 0.75 (Please see Table 3).

Table 4: Intermediate Solution to PRR’s Electoral Success

Paths leading to outcome	Consistency	Coverage	Covered Cases	Contradictory Cases
<i>ephilm*~libm*~ethpop</i>	0.875	0.254	POL2001 SLV2008	None
<i>ephilm*ethpop*libm*unemp</i>	0.509	0.454	SLK2006 SLK2010 ROM2000 BUL2005 HUN2010	SLK2002 HUN2006
Solution Consistency:	0.795			
Solution Coverage:	0.709			

3. Discussion

Schneider and Wagemann (2012:281) suggest “focusing on single conditions in ... conjunctural QCA solution terms usually runs counter to the logic of [QCA] method. ... If, however, in a given research field strong consensus prevails that a particular individual condition is indispensable for producing (or preventing) the outcome, then a researcher might exceptionally want to pay tribute to this prominence in the interpretation of the QCA results.” Considering that nativist nationalism as the distinctive feature of the PRR parties, ethnic diversity can be emphasized as a condition that set the political context in which the PRR electoral success occurred in CEECs. In fact, as Mudde suggests, “[the demand for the PRR parties] is generated “naturally” by the complex multiethnic western democracies” (Mudde, 2010:1179). Likewise, van der Brug and Fennema (2009:590) suggest “[the PRR parties] have promoted strong right-wing nationalism and, as such, they have mobilized anti-EU sentiments, as well as anti-Semitism and hate other ethnic groups, in particular the Roma.” Similar to these accounts, the intermediate solution term implies that the political context, in which the PRR parties became electorally successful, was contingent on the presence or absence of a notable Roma population. The LPR operating in a polity without noticeable Roma population was given a fertile ground thanks to the PiS’ socially illiberal policies. Despite its support for membership in the accession referendum, the PiS has embraced an ideology what the party calls “Polonism,” which attaches importance to policies aiming to enhance law and order and national identity (Pankowski, 2010:153-154). This finding combines two existing explanations for the PRR parties’ electoral success: 1) Ignazi’s (1992: 20) “political outbidding,” which holds the view that polarization of the party system stipulated by the right-wing mainstream party’s “move more and more to the right ... [paves] the way for [the PRR parties]” rather than inhibits them; 2) Bustikova’s (2009) “vacuum effect” of Europeanization in policy space “that led the party competition based on identity-based appeals, such as ethnic hatred, and set the stage for the success of [the PRR parties] in Eastern Europe.” This finding conflicts with arguments suggesting that the PRR electoral success should be attributed to convergence between mainstream parties, which leaves the far-edge of the party system to the PRR’s exploitation (Eatwell, 2003:58). This finding indicates that in countries

without a notable ethnic diversity, to prevent the electoral success of the PRR parties, it is the strategy, what terms “adversarial strategy,” rather than “accommodative strategy,” that mainstream parties should adopt (Meguid, 2005:348). For adding the contributory role of the right-wing mainstream party’s socially illiberal policies to the political context in which the LPR achieved electoral success in 2001 elections, this finding improves Minkenberg’s (2002:350) explanation for this success that highlights “the growing importance of the accession to the EU” in party competition against which the PRR, which had been deprived of such a persuasive target (i.e., Roma population), could mobilize the constituents.

The second path (configuration) in the intermediate solution covers the countries with a notable Roma population. This configuration largely represents the mirror image of the political context that occurred in countries less significant number of Rome people resides. The configuration suggests that the combination of the right-wing mainstream’s move towards the center for pursuing socially liberal policies, and positive stance about the EU membership favored the PRR electoral success. Nevertheless, the second path differs from the first one for having the condition of high levels of unemployment. This condition is a component of the political context allowing the PRR parties to achieve electoral success in countries with a notable Roma population. This finding invokes the ethnic competition theory, which has been emphasized for the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments among native populations in West Europe, and what Werts et al (2013: 185) summarize as the competition of ethnic groups, which have similar economic expectations, over scarce economic sources that underlies the perceived ethnic threat may be applicable to the CEECs as well. Alternatively, considering the abovementioned finding in the Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009) study on issue salience, the presence of this condition can be attributed to the economic backwardness of the countries covered by this path. Then, it is not surprising that this path also covers the Hungarian 2010 parliamentary election, when JOBBIK achieved an electoral success in a party competition marked by the negative consequences of the 2009 Euro-crisis.

A striking finding of the test of sufficiency is that neither of the paths in the intermediate solution included the problem of corruption as an ingredient of the political context under which the PRR parties achieve electoral success. This conflicts with the model developed in Ziller and Schubel’s (2015:377) study, which, by regarding corruption as a reason for decrease in the trust in public officials, argues that the PRR parties benefit from the decreasing trend in confidence in public officials. Instead, this finding tends to support Greskovits who suggests that the dissatisfied voters do not go to polls rather than do vote for a political party in the CEECs (Greskovits, 2007:44). Similarly, a recently published binomial logistic analysis for the impact of perceived corruption on voting behavior concludes: “Those who believe fraud is endemic seem to be discouraged to cast ballots and remove corrupt politicians from office” (Kostadinova & Kmetty, 2019:572). From an alternative perspective, drawing on the assumption that the corruption is a valence issue, such as political competence or moral integrity, it is logical to expect that high levels of perceived corruption electorally benefits a political party unless the party has been involved in corrupt activities previously. Yet, the PRR parties hardly exemplify such parties (Mudde, 2010:1180).

Conclusion

Employing the fuzzy-set QCA, this study revisited the political contexts under which the PRR electoral success occurred. The analysis focused on parliamentary elections held in the CEECs in the period 2000 to 2010. The Roma population, unemployment level, and perceived corruption level, the right-wing mainstream party’s socially liberal policies and support for the EU membership were included as potential components, the presence of created the political contexts that favoured the PRR electoral success. The test of necessity concluded that none of

the conditions were necessary for the occurrence of the PRR electoral success. The test of sufficiency suggested that the presence or absence of ethnic diversity should be regarded as the decisive condition shaping the political contexts in which the PRR parties achieved electoral success in parliamentary elections held between 2000 and 2010.

In countries without ethnic diversity (i.e., the absence of a notable Roma population), the PRR success occurred when the right-wing mainstream parties voiced socially illiberal policies in spite of their support for EU membership. This finding conflicts with the expectation based on the spatial theory of party competition underlining the contributory role of the right-wing mainstream party's move towards centre for the PRR electoral success. In countries with a notable Roma population, however, spatial theory of party competition was confirmed on the condition that the country suffered the problem of unemployment. The contribution of the unemployment problem to the electoral success of the PRR parties confirms the "ethnic competition approach," arguing that the ethnic-competition over scarce sources benefitted ethnic nationalist parties such as the PRR. Similarly, this finding is in line with the existing findings about the positive impact of the economic adversities on the PRR electoral success.

This fuzzy-set QCA for PRR electoral success indicates other theoretical implications for the non-occurrence of the PRR electoral success. First, of the alternative right-wing mainstream party's strategies, what Meguid (2005:348) calls "accommodative strategy" and "adversarial strategy," it should be the former in countries with ethnic diversity and the latter in countries without a notable Roma population. Second, accession negotiations for the EU membership helped the PRR parties by creating a vacuum in the party competition for restricting political manoeuvres of mainstream parties; yet this impact of the EU membership can be valid only for the pre-membership period as long as positive perception about the benefits of the EU membership hovers at higher levels in all CEECs. Third, the scholarly debate about the contributory role of the corruption in the electoral performance of the PRR parties should be revised because the parties' credibility can hardly be strong enough to convince most voters that they can challenge the problem effectively. Finally, it should be noted that this fuzzy-set QCA for the electoral success of the PRR parties should be supplemented by a within-case comparative analysis. A comparison that would develop a model on the basis of the most similar system design, for example, would reveal the missing condition(s) accounting for the electoral failure of the PRR party in Slovakia (in 2002 election) or in Hungary (in 2006 election) in spite of the favourable political context under which the PRR parties secured parliamentary seats in both countries in 2006 and 2010 elections, respectively.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Calibration of Raw Data on Outcome and Conditions

Case	UNEMP	CORR	ETHPOP	LIBM	EPHILM	SUCCESS
BUL2005	1	0.6	1	0.8	1	0.8
BUL2009	0.4	0.6	1	0.8	1	0.8
CZE2002	0.8	0.6	0.2	1	0.4	0
CZE2006	0.6	0.6	0.2	1	0.2	0
CZE2010	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.4	0
HUN2002	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.4
HUN2006	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.2
HUN2010	1	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1
POL2001	1	0.6	0	0.4	0.6	0.8
POL2005	1	0.8	0	0.2	0.4	0.8
POL2007	1	0.6	0	0.2	0.2	0
ROM2000	1	0.8	1	0.8	1	1
ROM2004	0.4	0.8	1	0.6	1	1
ROM2008	0	0.6	1	0.8	1	0.4
SLK2002	1	0.6	1	1	1	0.4
SLK2006	1	0.6	1	1	1	1
SLK2010	1	0.6	1	0.8	0.8	0.6
SLV2000	0.4	0.4	0	0.8	1	0.6
SLV2004	0.8	0.4	0	0.6	1	0.6
SLV2008	0.4	0.2	0	0.4	0.8	0.6

Appendix 2: The Result of the Truth-Table Analysis: Test of Sufficiency

Model: SUCCESS = f(UNEMP, CORR, ETHPOP, LIBM, EPHILM)

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

COMPLEX SOLUTION

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 0.772727

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency

UNEMP*ETHPOP*LIBM*EPHILM	0.509091	0.454545	0.756757
~UNEMP*~CORR*~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM	0.127273	0.0363637	0.875
UNEMP*CORR*~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM	0.218182	0.109091	0.857143

solution coverage: 0.709091

solution consistency: 0.795918

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term UNEMP*ETHPOP*LIBM*EPHILM: SLK2002 (1,0.4), SLK2006 (1,1), BUL2005 (0.8,0.8), ROM2000 (0.8,1), SLK2010 (0.8,0.6), HUN2006 (0.6,0.2), HUN2010 (0.6,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~UNEMP*~CORR*~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM: SLV2008 (0.6,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term UNEMP*CORR*~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM: POL2001 (0.6,0.8)

PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 0.772727

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency

UNEMP*ETHPOP	0.545454	0.490909	0.731707
~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM	0.254545	0.2	0.875

solution coverage: 0.745454

solution consistency: 0.773585

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term UNEMP*ETHPOP: BUL2005 (1,0.8), ROM2000 (1,1), SLK2002 (1,0.4), SLK2006 (1,1), SLK2010 (1,0.6), HUN2010 (0.8,1), HUN2006 (0.6,0.2)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM: POL2001 (0.6,0.8), SLV2008 (0.6,0.6)

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 0.772727

Assumptions:

UNEMP (present)

CORR (present)

ETHPOP (present)

LIBM (present)

EPHILM (present)

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency

~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM	0.254545	0.2	0.875
UNEMP*ETHPOP*LIBM*EPHILM	0.509091	0.454545	0.756757

solution coverage: 0.709091

solution consistency: 0.795918

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ETHPOP*~LIBM*EPHILM: POL2001 (0.6,0.8), SLV2008 (0.6,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term UNEMP*ETHPOP*LIBM*EPHILM: SLK2002 (1,0.4), SLK2006 (1,1), BUL2005 (0.8,0.8), ROM2000 (0.8,1), SLK2010 (0.8,0.6), HUN2006 (0.6,0.2), HUN2010 (0.6,1)